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A Look into the Data Privacy
Crystal Ball: A Survey of Possible
Outcomes for the EU-U.S. Privacy
Shield Agreement
ABSTRACT
The trade relationship between the European Union and the
United States, the largest cross-border data flow in the world, is
in a state of uncertainty. Operating under different notions of
what privacy should look like and divergent legal protections for
personal data, the European Union and United States have
struggled to reach a mutually acceptable agreement in the past.
This Note analyzes their latest attempt, the EU-U.S. Privacy
Shield, with specific emphasis on (1) the way it has improved
upon its predecessor, the EU-U.S. Safe Harbor; (2) the
weaknesses that still remain; and (3) the external factors that
threaten the future success of the agreement. Without attempting
to predict a specific outcome, this Note surveys the potential
challenges to the Privacy Shield in the coming years and
considers potential alternative frameworks. This Note proposes
that the agreement should be restructured into a private-public
EU-U.S. business arrangement, in which a Data Privacy NGO
takes over the duties of the US government. By relying on
corporate self-regulation, the Privacy Shield can preserve its
basic framework and Privacy Principles, while minimizing the
vulnerabilities that make the agreement susceptible to
invalidation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Personal data is a currency of the modern age and a valuable
commodity in an increasingly electronic world. However, unlike
traditional forms of currency, personal data inherently relies on
private information about real people, occupying a sacred space that
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warrants heightened protection. The dominant exchange of this
ubiquitous personal data currency occurs between EU member states
and the United States. Despite this, the United States and the
European Union historically have fallen short in reaching a consensus
about the permissible process by which EU personal data can be
transferred to the United States.'
On October 6, 2015, the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU) issued a decision invalidating Safe Harbor, the previous EU-
U.S. privacy agreement that permitted data transfer between the
European Union and the United States. In invalidating the agreement,
CJEU explained that Safe Harbor was not compliant with the Data
Protection Directive and US enforcement of the agreement prioritized
US concerns over the Safe Harbor Principles.2 Less than a year later,
the European Commission (EC) approved a new data sharing
agreement, the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (Privacy Shield), which went
into effect on August 1, 2016. 3 While the Privacy Shield is an
improvement on the protection afforded to EU citizens and their
personal data, the framework of the new agreement is not immune to
challenge by the European Union and faces an uncertain future.
This Note investigates the range of possible outcomes that could
result from the Privacy Shield. Part II examines the differing notions
of privacy within the European Union and the United States, and
analyzes the EU Data Protection Directive's impact on US collection,
usage, and onward transfer of EU personal data. Part III outlines the
predecessor agreement, EU-U.S. Safe Harbor, and discusses the
rationale for its invalidation. Part IV introduces the new agreement,
the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, outlining its structure, identifying the
improvements within the new framework, and recognizing the
weaknesses that threaten its long-term success. Part V considers the
potential challenges for the Privacy Shield in the upcoming years: joint
annual review and review by the European Court of Justice. Next, it
offers a synopsis of the alternative mechanisms for compliance if the
Privacy Shield framework is invalidated. Part V concludes by
recommending restructuring the Privacy Shield as a public-private
arrangement, replacing the role of the US government with a Data
Privacy non-governmental organization (NGO) to exploit the
1. See Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Protection Comm'r, 2015 E.C.R. § 106
(serving as the latest failure to reach a data sharing agreement that satisfies the EU
Data Protection Directive's requirements).
2. See id. (holding that the Safe Harbor did not meet the Article 25 requirement
for "an adequate level of protection" required to safeguard EU data subjects'
fundamental right).
3. Press Release, European Commission, European Commission Launches EU-
U.S. Privacy Shield (July 12, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-16-
2461_en.htm [https://perma.cclDA6V-T5DK] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
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improvements in the Privacy Shield, while minimizing the risk of
invalidation.
II. BACKGROUND
This Note only concerns the transfer of EU personal data to the
United States for collection, usage, or onward transfer. Examples of
these transactions include the inter-workings of one company with
branches in both the United States and the European Union, travel
corporations or online retailers who require personal information to
finalize transactions, online educational institutions that seek
personal statistics, social media platforms, and human resource
companies, to name a few.4 While there is no universal definition of
personal data, the European Union has defined it as any information
that makes it possible to identify a person, including: names, phone
numbers, birthdates, both home and email addresses, credit card
numbers, national insurance numbers, IP addresses, employee
information including number, login information, gender, and marital
status, and biometric and genetic data. 5 Personal data includes
aggregate data, which involves the aggregation of information from
servers and personal online profiles in order to tailor online ads to the
specific preferences of a targeted user.6
If the Privacy Shield fails, the consequences will be severe,
impacting not only the EU member states' and the United States'
economy, but global trade as well. The European Parliament
recognized the importance of the EU-U.S. trade relationship; noting
that cross-border data flows between the European Union and the
United States are the highest in the world-50 percent higher than
any other transfer-and acknowledging personal data as an essential
component.7 The Department of Commerce (DOC) noted that EU-U.S.
4. EUROPEAN COMM'N, GUIDE TO THE EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD 7 (2016),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/citizens-guide-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N2NC-KXWR] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
5. Id.; Svetlana Yakovieva, Researcher, Inst. for Info. Law at the Univ. of
Amsterdam, Speech at Vanderbilt Law School: The Protection of Personal Data in
International Transactions (Sept. 22, 2016) (noting that there is no uniform definition,
which makes it harder to negotiate between EU-US, citing as an example the fact that
IP address fall under the EU's definition of personal data but would not be considered so
in the US).
6. Lior Abraham et al., Scuba Diving in Data at Facebook, FACEBOOK INC.,
http://db.disi.unitn.eulpages/VLDBProgramlpdf/industry/p767-wiener.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J85W-X6KJ] (archived Sept. 21, 2017); Thorin Klosowski, How
Facebook Uses Your Data to Target Ads, Even Offline, LIFEHACKER.COM (Apr. 11, 2013),
http://1ifehacker.com/5994380/how-facebook-uses-your-data-to-target-ads-even-offline
[https://perma.cc/Z3C3-C5G6] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
7. European Parliament Resolution on Transatlantic Data Flows, 2016/2727
(RSP) (May 26, 2016) [hereinafter Resolution 2016/2727].
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transatlantic trading is the largest trading relationship in the world,
estimated to produce half a trillion dollars of commerce annually,
representing half of all US investments abroad, and employing 3.5
million Americans.8 Clearly, there is a lot at stake both for consumers
and corporate entities in the United States and the European Union.9
The United States and the European Union not only have
different notions of what personal data includes, but also operate under
two very different definitions of privacy more generally, which impact
their respective laws and public policies.'0 As a result, the European
Union and the United States have opposing views of what data
protection specifically looks like and how it should be implemented."
Despite these differences, the European Union and the United States
have recognized the profound need for cooperation and consensus.
A. Differing Notions of Privacy in the United States and the European
Union
The historical notion of privacy in the United States differs from
that of the European Union. To start, the word "privacy" is absent from
the US Constitution.12 American jurisprudence has recognized that a
8. Letter from Kenneth E. Hyatt, Deputy Under Sec. for Int'l Trade, U.S. Dep't
of Commerce Int'l Trade Admin., to Vra JourovA, Comm'r for Justice, Consumers and
Gender Equality, The Eur. Comm'n, (July 7, 2016),
https://www.privacyshield.gov/servlet/servlet.FileDownload?file=015t00000004q0M
[https://perma.cc/J2DF-28ZK] (archived Sept. 22, 2017); INFO. TECH. INDUS. COUNCIL,
THE EU-US PRIVACY SHIELD: WHAT'S AT STAKE 1 (2016),
http://www.itic.org/dotAsset/9/b/9b4cb3ad-6d8b-469d-bdO3-b2e52d7aOecd.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2WYY-8Q4Y] (archived on Sept. 22, 2017).
9. INFO. TECH. INDUS. COUNCIL, supra note 8.
10. See generally Barbara Crutfield George et al., U.S. Multinational Employers:
Navigating Through the "Safe Harbor" Principles to Comply with the EU Data Privacy
Directive, 38 AM. BUS. L. J. 735, 741-749 (2001) (detailing the conflicting definitions of
privacy in the U.S. and EU).
11. See generally id. (detailing the conflicting cultural, legal, and political
attitudes between the U.S. and EU countries concerning what is private and how privacy
should be maintained).
12. The Supreme Court, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
recognized that while a right to privacy could be found in the "penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees" in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments, a right to privacy is not expressly mentioned in the text. The First
Amendment right of association creates the right to freely meet and to have privacy in
associations. The Third Amendment prohibition against the quartering of soldiers in the
home creates a zone of privacy in the home. The Fourth Amendment right of people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, creates the right to privacy in the home and "privacies of life." The Fifth
Amendment Self-Incrimination clause "enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy
which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment." The Ninth
Amendment states "enumeration in Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people," suggesting that while a
2017/1 1315
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right to privacy is implicit in the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
against unreasonable search and seizure. 13 However, courts have
historically limited this right to criminal matters, leaving lackluster
constitutional protection for civil privacy rights.14
Beyond the Constitution, there is also a common law privacy tort
in the United States: invasion of privacy. 15 However, the tort's
protection is narrow in reach: once an individual publishes personal
information, he or she waives the right to sue for the tort.16 Statutory
law in the United States has also failed to create a comprehensive set
of privacy standards.'7 Instead, legislative enactment has taken a
piecemeal approach, passing narrow laws that are scattered across
specific target genres.'8 Often these pieces of legislation are reactive
and narrow in scope, creating privacy rights in instances where highly
publicized violations have engendered public concern.19 Notably, the
right of privacy is not listed, it may exist. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. 1, 111, IV, V,
IX; see Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
13. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.").
14. Consider, for example, the broad power of court-enforced civil discovery with
the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable governmental searches and
seizures.
15. See generally Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 483-485 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that even if the governmental actor did not violate the
petitioner's constitutional rights in wiretapping his telephone, the government can still
be liable in tort for a common law invasion of privacy. Olmstead's ubstantive ruling was
overturned in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), when the Court determined
that wiretapping was a "search" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and the
defendant had a "reasonable expectation of privacy.").
16. Therefore, while U.S. law recognizes the potential for privacy concerns, the
extent of this protection is limited to a very thin margin of cases that do not account for
the personal data concerns addressed in this Note. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D.
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 216 (Dec. 15, 1890).
17. Chuan Sun, The European Union Privacy Directive and Its Impact on the
U.S. Privacy Protection Policy: A Year 2003 Perspective, 2 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
99, 1Q5 (2003).
18. See id.; see also Jasmine McNealy & Angelyn Flowers, Privacy Law and
Regulation: Technologies, Implications, and Solutions, in PRIVACY IN A DIGITAL,
NETWORKED WORLD 189, 194-196 (S. Zeadally & M. Badra eds:, Springer International
Publishing 2015) (examples of narrowly constructed laws include the Cable
Communications Policy Act, requiring cable companies to protect the privacy of
consumer records; the Video Privacy Protection Act, protecting the privacy of videotape
rental information; the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, protecting consumers
against telemarketers; the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act,
upholding the privacy of medical records; and the Children's Online Privacy Protection
Act, restricting internet providers' collection and use of personal information of children
under age 13).
19. See McNealy & Flowers, supra note 18, at 195 (viewing anti-terrorism
legislation like the USA Patriot Act which allowed for easier law enforcement acquisition
of voicemails as a reaction to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001).
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majority of legal privacy protections in the United States guard against
government intrusion. When regulation of the private sector must
occur, there is a strong presumption in favor of self-regulation as the
"least intrusive and most efficient means," preferring soft laws that
permit, but do not compel, private actors' participation.20
The European Union has a very different notion of privacy that is
reflected in the protections afforded individuals. Rather than limiting
privacy rights to instances of government intrusion, the European
Union recognizes privacy and data protection as an express right that
protects individuals from corporate data collection.2 1 Privacy of one's
personal data is a fundamental right that is guaranteed by the
European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights.22 This sui generis
right, analogous to a constitutional right in the United States, is
grounded in international human rights instruments.23
In addition to recognizing a right to privacy, the European Union
also asserts that data protection is an essential mechanism for
protecting EU citizens' fundamental rights.24 The Guidelines on the
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (OECD
Guidelines) were created by the Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD), an intergovernmental
organization with thirty-five participating members, including the
European Union.2 5 The OECD Guidelines provide suggestions on what
should be taken into account when developing legislation on privacy
and data protection and highlight principles to preserve individual
rights while easing restrictions on the flow of information between
nations.26 The European Union's adoption of the OECD Guidelines, by
20. Sun, supra note 17, at 106.
21. McNealy & Flowers, supra note 18, at 203.
22. Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8, Dec. 18,
2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 10. ("1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data
concerning him or her. 2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and
on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid
down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected
concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 3. Compliance with these rules
shall be subject to control by an independent authority.").
23. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, arts. 8-11, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005; see also Convention for the Protection
of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981,
E.T.S. 108; Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 22,
arts. 8, 12.
24. See McNealy & Flowers, supra note 18, at 198 (finding a right to privacy to
be part of a body of rights considered to be both a human right and a fundamental
freedom).
25. See Mike Ewing, The Perfect Storm: The Safe Harbor and the Directive on
Data Protection, 24 Hous. J. INT'L L. 315, 319-323 (2001).
26. See LEE A. BYGRAVE, DATA PRIVACY LAW 43 (Oxford Univ. Press 2014);
Ewing, supra note 25, at 320-321 (listing the eight principles: collection limitation, data
quality, purpose specification, use limitation, security safeguards, openness, individual
participation and accountability).
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virtue of its membership in the OECD, resulted in each EU member
state largely enacting its own data protection rules from the OECD
Guidelines, creating uncertainty and inconsistency in legislation
throughout the European Union. 27 To remedy the confusion, EU
member states voted to create a unified piece of legislation: The Data
Protection Directive.
B. Standard for Transfer of EU Data: Data Protection Directive &
General Data Protection Regulation
Directive 95/46EC 28 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 24 October 1995, colloquially known as the Data Protection
Directive (the Directive), aimed to harmonize data protection
frameworks within the European Union by creating a more stable
regulatory framework that required a uniform minimum standard of
privacy protection across the European Union. 29 Specifically, the
Directive sought to achieve two goals: 1) facilitating the free flow of
personal data within the EU; and 2) ensuring an equally high level of
protection within all countries in the EU for "the fundamental rights
and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to
privacy."30
Of particular concern for this Note is Article 25 of the Directive,
which specifies that personal data processed in the European Union
can only be transferred to a party in a non-member state if the non-
member state "ensures an adequate level of protection."3 ' The EC
assesses adequacy and reviews data protection legislation in the non-
EU country and then makes a determination with the assistance of the
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party's (WP29) non-binding
opinion. 32 "The Directive does not define what creates an adequate
27. See Ewing, supra note 25, at 323 (noting that "disparities in national
legislation could hamper the free flow of data across frontiers . . . caus[ing] serious
disruptions in important sectors of the economy, such as banking and insurance. . . .")
see also id. at 328-329 (highlighting EU member countries' calls for the "creation of a
single, binding standard for all EU members.").
28. Directives are not immediately binding, but rather "harmonizing"
instruments that require each member state to enact national legislation that reflects
the principles inherent in the directive; the Data Protection Directive requires member
states to enact common rules regarding information privacy. Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-
U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966,
1971-72 (2013).
29. European Council Directive 95/46, art. 1, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 1, 2.
30. Schwartz, supra note 28, at 1972.
31. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 29, at art. 25.
32. See W. Gregory Voss, The Future of Transatlantic Data Flows: Privacy Shield
or Bust?, 19 NO. 11 J. INTERNET L. 1, 8-9 (2016) (noting that the WP 29's opinion is "not
binding, but may be persuasive"). The WP 29 "is an independent privacy advisory group
made up of, inter alia, representatives of the EU Member States national data protection
authorities." Id.
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level of protection, but it indicates that all the circumstances
surrounding the transfer, including the laws in force in the third
country, must be considered by the supervising authority in making a
determination about adequacy." 33
Article 25 reflects the EC's intention that the "high level of
protection within EU borders is not circumvented in cases where
personal data originally collected or stored in a member state under
the purview of the Directive is processed or transmitted outside the
European Union."34 In practice, this led many of the countries that
interacted with the European Union to alter their domestic privacy
laws to align with the Directive.35
Lacking an omnibus privacy protection regime, many US entities
questioned the continuing legality of data transfers in light of Article
25's nebulous "adequacy" requirement.36 The United States' sectoral
approach to data protection, relying on a combination of legislation,
regulation, and self-regulation, differed from the protections afforded
by the Directive, and likely would have been deemed inadequate if a
member state had requested an adequacy decision from the EC.37 In
practice, such a finding could impede transatlantic personal banking,
brokerage transactions, hotel and airplane purchases, and credit card
purchases involving EU citizens, as well as restrict multinational
companies' ability to manage millions of employees with offices in the
European Union. 38 To avoid a designation of inadequacy and the
halting of data transfers from the European Union to the United
States, the DOC initiated a two-year negotiation with the European
Union, which resulted in the Safe Harbor Agreement.3 9
33. George et al., supra note 10, at 759.
34. Sun, supra note 17, at 104.
35. George et al., supra note 10, at 763-64; see, e.g. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
AND HUNTON & WILLIAMS, BUSINESS WITHOUT BORDERS: THE IMPORTANCE OF CROSS-
BORDER DATA TRANSFERS TO GLOBAL PROSPERITY (2014),
https://www.hunton.comlimages/content/3/0/v2/3086/Business-withoutBorders.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R949-VJ2V] (archived Sept. 24, 2017) (citing countries outside the EU
with laws that mimic the EU Directive, including Azerbaijan, Dubai International
Financial Centre, Israel, Russia, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Mexico,
Peru, India, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea).
36. Schwartz, supra note 28, at 1980 (noting that while the EU never formally
ruled on the adequacy of U.S. data protection laws, "the EU consensus [wa]s that the
United States lacks an adequate level of protection").
37. Voss, supra note 32, at 9 (noting that because this "sectoral approach" was
viewed as inadequate, the U.S. and EU entered into the negotiations that would
eventually result in the Safe Harbor Agreement).
38. George et al., supra note 10, at 738. But see infra Part V.C. (acknowledging
that companies that used alternative compliance mechanisms such as BCRs, SCC, or
consent could continue data transfer even if the EC ruled that U.S. data protections were
inadequate).
39. McKay Cunningham, Complying with International Data Protection Law, 84
U. CIN. L. REV. 421, 441 (2016).
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As a brief aside, on May 4, 2016, the EU Commission adopted EU
Regulation 2016/679, known as the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), which replaces the Directive and goes into effect
on May 25, 2018.40 While this domestic change is significant for EU
data protection requirements, for the purposes of this Note, the
adequacy standard for non-member states under Article 25 is
analogous to the new GDPR Article 45 requirement for permissible
transfers, mandating "an adequate level of protection."41
III. LEARNING FROM THE PAST
A. EU-U.S. Safe Harbor Agreement
The Safe Harbor Agreement, effective November 1, 2000, allowed
US organizations a voluntary mechanism by which to demonstrate the
adequacy of their data protection under the Directive. Pursuant to the
agreement, a company receiving personal data from the European
Union must abide by the following Safe Harbor Privacy Principles:
40. Id. at 428-29 (noting that the new EU Data Protection Regulation "confirms
the strictures of the Directive").
41. Commission Regulation 2016/679 of 4 May 2016 on The Protection of Natural
Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of
Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 61 ("A transfer of
personal data to a third country or an international organization may take place where
the Commission has decided that the third country, or territory or one or more specified
sectors within that third country, or the international organization in question ensures
an adequate level of protection.").
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notice, 42 choice, 43 onward transfer, 44 security, 45 data integrity, 46
access, 4 7 and enforcement. 48 These principles come from the Fair
42. Notice is defined as:
An organization must inform individuals about the purposes for
which it collects and uses information about them, how to contact the
organization with any inquiries or complaints, the types of third
parties to which it discloses the information, and the choices and
means the organization offers individuals for limiting its use and
disclosure. This notice must be provided in clear and conspicuous
language when individuals are first asked to provide personal
information to the organization or as soon thereafter as is
practicable, but in any event before the organization uses such
information for a purpose other than that for which it was originally
collected or processed by the transferring organization or discloses it
for the first time to a third party.
Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council on The Adequacy of the Protection Provided by the Safe
Harbor Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the US
Department of Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7.
43. Choice is defined as:
An organization must offer individuals the opportunity to choose (opt
out) whether their personal information is (a) to be disclosed to a
third party[] or (b) to be used for a purpose that is incompatible with
the purpose(s) for which it was originally collected or subsequently
authorized by the individual. Individuals must be provided with
clear and conspicuous, readily available, and affordable mechanisms
to exercise choice. For sensitive information (i.e. personal
information specifying medical or health conditions, racial or ethnic
origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade
union membership or information specifying the sex life of the
individual), they must be given affirmative or explicit (opt in) choice
if the information is to be disclosed to a third party or used for a
purpose other than those for which it was originally collected or
subsequently authorized by the individual through the exercise of opt
in choice. In any case, an organization should treat as sensitive any
information received from a third party where the third party treats
and identifies it as sensitive.
Id.
44. Onward Transfer is defined as:
To disclose information to a third party, organizations must apply
the Notice and Choice Principles. Where an organization wishes to
transfer information to a third party that is acting as an agent, as
described in the endnote[], it may do so if it first either ascertains
that the third party subscribes to the Principles or is subject to the
Directive or another adequacy finding or enters into a written
agreement with such third party requiring that the third party
provide at least the same level of privacy protection as is required by
the relevant Principles. If -the organization complies with these
requirements, it shall not be held responsible (unless the
organization agrees otherwise) when a third party to which it
transfers such information processes it in a way contrary to any
restrictions or representations, unless the organization knew or
should have known the third party would process it in such a
20.17} 1321
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Information Practices developed by the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) 49 and track with many of the requirements found in the
Directive.5 0
The FTC enforced this agreement, categorizing any violation of
the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles as an unfair or deceptive practice
pursuant to Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which
prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
contrary way and the organization has not taken reasonable steps to
prevent or stop such processing.
Id. (internal endnote deleted).
45. Security is defined as:
Organizations creating, maintaining, using or disseminating
personal information must take reasonable precautions to protect it
from loss, misuse and unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and
destruction.
Id.
46. Data Integrity is defined as:
Consistent with the Principles, personal information must be
relevant for the purposes for which it is to be used. An organization
may not process personal information in a way that is incompatible
with the purposes for which it has been collected or subsequently
authorized by the individual. To the extent necessary for those
purposes, an organization should take reasonable steps to ensure
that data is reliable for its intended use, accurate, complete, and
current.
Id.
47. Access is defined as:
Individuals must have access to personal information about them
that an organization holds and be able to correct, amend, or delete
that information where it is inaccurate, except where the burden or
expense of providing access would be disproportionate to the risks to
the individual's privacy in the case in question, or where the rights
of persons other than the individual would be violated.
Id.
48. Enforcement is defined as:
Effective privacy protection must include mechanisms for assuring
compliance with the Principles, recourse for individuals to whom the
data relate affected by non-compliance with the Principles, and
consequences for the organization when the Principles are not
followed. At a minimum, such mechanisms must include (a) readily
available and affordable independent recourse mechanisms by which
each individual's complaints and disputes are investigated and
resolved by reference to the Principles and damages awarded where
the applicable law or private sector initiatives so provide; (b) follow
up procedures for verifying that the attestations and assertions
businesses make about their privacy practices are true and that
privacy practices have been implemented as presented; and (c)
obligations to remedy problems arising out of failure to comply with
the Principles by organizations announcing their adherence to them
and consequences for such organizations. Sanctions must be
sufficiently rigorous to ensure compliance by organizations.
Id.
49. Sun, supra note 17, at 107.
50. Voss, supra note 32, at 9.
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commerce."51 Only US organizations within the jurisdiction of the FTC
or the Department of Transportation (DOT) were eligible for self-
certification under the Safe Harbor Agreement, thus excluding
financial institutions from certifying under the Safe Harbor.52
To self-certify, an organization had to take the following steps: (1)
confirm it was subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC or the DOT; (2)
develop a binding privacy policy that mirrored the Safe Harbor Privacy
Principles; (3) post the policy referencing Safe Harbor compliance so it
was visible to the public; (4) develop an independent recourse
mechanism for complaints; and (5) designate a contact person within
the organization to receive any complaints.5 3 The benefits of the Safe
Harbor attached on the date of self-certification with the DOC. This
occurred upon the submission of a letter from the corporate officer (1)
containing the organization's contact information; (2) explaining the
extent of the company's processing of EU data; (3) describing the
privacy policy created to protect that data; and (4) stating the
company's claim of self-certification.5 4 Submission of this letter gave
rise to a "presumption of adequacy" under the Directive.5 5 To ensure
continued adherence to the agreement, organizations were required to
re-register yearly with the DOC, which housed a list of all the
organizations compliant with Safe Harbor.56
While the EC issued a decision stating that the Safe Harbor
agreement "ensure[d] an adequate level of protection for personal data
transferred from the community to organizations established in the
United States," 5 not everyone was pleased with the protections
provided. Some critics of Safe Harbor argued that the agreement was
only a "minimalist solution," and that the United States never
intended to follow through on its commitment to strengthen
protections over time. 58 Others pointed to the absence of actual
enforcement by the FTC-which until 2009 had not brought a single
enforcement action under the agreement. 59 Many believed these
51. Id. at 14; see also Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (prohibiting
"unfair or deceptive acts or practice in or affecting commerce").
52. Cunningham, supra note 39, at 443 (based upon this limitation, in actuality
"only U.S. organizations subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC as well as U.S. air carriers
and ticket agents subject to the jurisdiction of the DoT could participate in Safe Harbor.
Many organizations that deal in foreign commerce were not eligible for the Safe Harbor
program, including certain financial institutions-like banks, investment houses, and
credit unions, telecommunication common carriers, labor associations, non-profit
organizations, and agricultural co-operatives").
53. Id. at 444.
54. Id.
55. See Ewing, supra note 25, at 338.
56. Id. at 340.
57. Sean D. Murphy, U.S.-EU "Safe Harbor" Data Privacy Arrangement, 95 AM.
J. INT'L L. 156, 159 (2001).
58. Voss, supra note 32, at 10.
59. See Cunningham, supra note 39, at 446.
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weaknesses highlighted the current agreement's inability to provide
real protection for EU personal data. 60 The Snowden revelations
served only to further diminish the European Union's trust in cross-
border data flows with the United States.6 1
B. Safe Harbor Invalidated: The Schrems Holding
While talks of revisions to the Safe Harbor were in the works, the
CJEU issued a ruling that invalidated Safe Harbor, prematurely
determining the status of the agreement.62 Maximillian Schrems, an
Austrian law student and privacy advocate, brought a complaint
against the Irish Data Protection Authority (DPA) 63 for failing to
consider his twenty-three complaints against Facebook's Irish
subsidiary for transferring Schrems' personal data to its US parent
company.64 Schrems originally brought the case in the High Court of
Ireland, which referred the questions concerning the continued
adequacy of the Safe Harbor to the CJEU.65 Schrems argued that, in
light of the National Security Agency (NSA) revelations concerning US
intelligence authorities' practice of accessing personal data without
court approval, his personal data lacked the adequate protection
required by the Directive.6 6
The CJEU, which interprets and reviews EU law, holds the sole
power to invalidate EU legal actions and determine the compatibility
of international agreements with EU law.6 7 In its holding invalidating
the EU-U.S. agreement, the CJEU highlighted several fatal flaws in
60. Id. at 447 (noting that a 2008 study found that of 1,597 companies that self-
certified, only "348 complied with the enforcement and dispute resolution principle").
61. See Alan S. Gutterman, U.S. Companies Need to Prepare for Requirements of
Privacy Shield to Continue Data Transfer from European Union, 7 BUS. COUNSELOR
UPDATE (July 2016) (noting that following the Snowden leaks, it was clear "that the
original Safe Harbor Agreement would need to be revised or replaced in light of the
questions regarding surveillance and personal data protection in the U.S."); see also
Voss, supra note 32, at 3 (noting that the Snowden leaks sent an "electroshock" across
the EU "encourag[ing] the advancement of EU data protection law reform and negatively
impacting trust in cross-border data flows with the United States").
62. See Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Protection Comm'r, 2015 E.C:R. 26
(noting that the ruling was issued on October 6, 2015); see also Voss, supra note 32, at 3
(noting the same and providing background information on the case).
63. KRISTINA IRION, SVETLANA YAKOVLEVA & MARIJA BARTL, TRADE AND
PRIVACY: COMPLICATED BEDFELLOWS? 13 (2016),
https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/1807 [https://perma.cc/8ZJA-2XHW] (archived
Oct. 8, 2017) (explaining that national DPAs in each member state are charged with
"implementing and enforcing" the national data protection laws).
64. Voss, supra note 32, at 3.
65. Id.
66. Schrems, 2015 E.C.R. § 28.
67. See IRION ET AL., supra note 63, at 11-12 (discussing the authority of the
CJEU to review Privacy Shield based on the supervisory opinion procedure provided for
in Article 218(11) of the TFEU).
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Safe Harbor, which are instructive when hypothesizing about he
future of the successor, Privacy Shield. These include the lack of
protection from US surveillance,68 the absence of any mechanism to
hold the US government accountable for its promises under the
agreement,69 and the lack of accessible redress mechanisms for EU
citizens.70
Article 25 instructs the EC to assess the non-EU member
country's level of protection by looking at "the circumstances
surrounding a data transfer operation . .. [including] the rules of law,
both general and sectoral, in force . . . and the professional rules and
security measures."7 1 The CJEU noted that the EC, in deeming the
Safe Harbor framework adequately protective, only considered the
adequacy of the principles and implementation documents, and failed
to consider the larger scope of applicable US laws. The fact that US
domestic concerns regarding national security, public interest, or law
enforcement requirements had - primacy over the Safe Harbor
Principles deeply troubled the CJEU, and the reality that Safe Harbor
permitted interference with EU citizens' fundamental right to privacy
was unacceptable to the Court.7 2
Additionally, the CJEU found that while self-certified US
companies were legally obligated to provide "adequate" protection to
EU personal data, US government authorities were not similarly
bound to follow through on their commitments.7 3 Finally, the CJEU
highlighted the absence of "administrative or judicial means of redress"
68. See Schrems, 2015 E.C.R. § 86 (explaining that US "national security, public
interest, or law enforcement requirements have primacy over the safe harbor
principles").
69. See id. § 82 (expressing concern regarding the fact that US public authorities
are not required to comply with the Safe Harbor principles).
70. See id. § 90 (discussing the lack of administrative or judicial redress for EU
citizens); NATASCHA GERLACH, JAMES DALEY & CLEARY GOTTLIEB, FROM SAFE HARBOR
TO THE EU-US PRIVACY SHIELD (2016),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/cle/2016/05/cel605edv/cel605edv
cor.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/MIXC7-DZML] (archived Sept. 20, 2017) ("The
lack of legal remedies for non-US citizens/legal residents violates the right to effective
judicial protection.").
71. European Council Directive 95/46, art. 25, § 2, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31.
72. See Schrems, 2015 E.C.R. §§ 86-87 (rejecting the Safe Harbor because it
interfered with "the fundamental rights of the persons whose personal data is or could
be transferred from the European Union to the United States"); MARTIN A. WEISS &
KRISTEN ARCHICK, CONG. RES. SERV., U.S.-EU DATA PRIVACY: FROM SAFE HARBOR TO
PRIVACY SHIELD 7 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44257.pdf
[https://perma.cc/23WT-DS9X] (archived Sept. 20, 2017) (explaining that the CJEU
found that the Safe Harbor scheme interfered with fundamental privacy rights of EU
citizens); Nora Ni Loirdean, The End of Safe Harbor: Implications for EU Digital Privacy
and Data Protection Law, 19 NO. 8 J. INTERNET L. 1, 1 (2016) (discussing the CJEU's
decision to strike down the Safe Harbor scheme for failing to provide adequate protection
for fundamental privacy rights of EU citizens).
73. Schrems, 2015 E.C.R. § 82.
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for EU data subjects.74 Without a mechanism for EU citizens to have
their complaints assessed and remedied, the Court found US promises
to be illusory in the eyes of the Court and insufficient to protect
citizens' fundamental rights required under the Directive.7 5 Following
the invalidation of Safe Harbor, there was even more political pressure
on both sides of the Atlantic to reach a new agreement.76
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT: EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD AGREEMENT
On February 2, 2016, the European Union and the United States
announced the successor agreement to Safe Harbor, the EU-U.S.
Privacy Shield, and released a draft adequacy decision to the public
shortly thereafter. Many in the European Union criticized the draft,
including the WP29,77 the European Parliament78 and the European
74. Id. § 90.
75. Id. § 95.
76. See Voss, supra note 32, at 11 (discussing "other bases for adequacy in
transatlantic data flows" following the Schrems decision). Negotiations had been going
on since late 2013 in response to EU suspicion about NSA surveillance and its impact on
EU data. Other critics pointed out that the original agreement was established in the
late 1990s, and since then major technological advancements have occurred, which
implicate new issues that weren't perceived in the original negotiation. WEISS &
ARCHICK, supra note 72, at 8-9.
77. Opinion 01/2016 of Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, April 13, 2016,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2016/wp238 en.pdf [https://perma.cc/4D5N-DAAZ] (archived Oct.
8, 2017) (the EU Article 29 Working Party acknowledged that the Privacy Shield was a
"great step forward" but highlighted that there were still areas that were unacceptable,
including its lack of explicit denial of "massive and indiscriminate bulk" collection by US
authorities, concerns regarding commercial parts of the decision: including data
retention, data integrity and purpose limits, and assessing the law enforcement
guarantees under the Privacy Shield) [hereinafter Opinion 01/2016]; see also Privacy
Shield - Rejected. GDPR - Accepted: What This Means to Your Organization and What
You Should Consider Doing Now, FOLEY (April 16, 2016), https://www.foley.com/Privacy-
Shield--Rejected-GDPR--Accepted-What-This-Means-to-Your-Organization-and-What-
You-Should-Consider-Doing-Now-04-15-2016/ [https://perma.cc/4QPP-65MR] (archived
Oct. 17, 2017) (outlining the WP29's primary concerns with the proposed Privacy Shield
framework agreement); Gary Roboff, EU's GDPR and the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield: Where
Are We and Why Are We There?, THE SHARED ASSESSMENTS BLOG (May 31, 2016),
http://sharedassessments.org/2016/05/eus-gdpr-and-tbe-eu-us-privacy-shield-where-
are-we-and-why-are-we-there/ [https://perma.cc/3NZR-DBD6] (archived Sept. 21, 2017)
(explaining that the WP29's issues with the Privacy Shield "involved both commercial
entities and access by public authorities to data transferred under the Shield, especially
in areas related to national security").
78. See Resolution 2016/2727, supra note 7 (this non-binding resolution included
the following areas of concern and alteration: potential for bulk collection still
impermissibly being possible under draft calling for clarification on written assurances
from the US; asks for redress mechanisms that are "procedure user-friendly and
effective"; requests a sufficiently independent ombudsperson; and calls for the
Commission to implement fully the recommendations of Article 29 Working Party);
Privacy Shield and the General Data Protection Regulation: More Key Developments,
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Data Protection Supervisor, Giovanni Buttarelli.79 They all expressed
concerns regarding whether the new agreement provided the requisite
protection for EU data subjects. While this early dissonance was
nonbinding, many felt that "the Commission [was] obligated to take up
necessary adjustments to the adequacy decision in its negotiations
with the US," and that if these concerns were not addressed prior to
implementation of the Privacy Shield, the agreement would face
challenges before the CJEU.8 0
Taking many of the criticisms into consideration, the EC and DOC
amended the original draft. This updated version was then approved
by the Article 31- Committee (which is comprised of representatives of
each of the EU member states and has binding authority) 81 and
formally adopted by the full EC.82 The Privacy Shield went into effect
on July 12, 2016.83 The agreement not only created the potential for a
more stable and efficient compliance mechanism for US companies, but
also showed the strong force of transatlantic cooperation. 84 The
European Union and the United States recognized the need for an
SIDLEY (July 2, 2016), http://www.sidley.com/news/2016-06-02-privacy-update
(highlighting deficiencies in the current draft of the Privacy Shield identified by the
European Parliament).
79. See SIDLEY, supra note 78 (On May 30, 2016, Giovanni Buttarelli of the
EDPS issued his opinion on the EC's draft adequacy decision on the Privacy Shield citing
the need for more specific language concerning: data retention, automated processing,
purpose limits, explicit wording on exceptions, onward transfers, right to access and
right to object, and the right of redress and oversight).
80. Catherine Stupp, EU Privacy Watchdogs Demand Improvements to 'Privacy
Shield', EURACTIV.coM (Apr. 13, 2016, 11:08 AM),
http://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/newsleu-privacy-watchdogs-demand-
improvements-to-privacy-shield/ [https://perma.cc/4YTY-FA8Z] (archived Sept. 21,
2017).
81. WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 72, at 12.
82. While the Commission approved the Privacy Shield, making the agreement
final, there were four out of the twenty-eight EU diplomats that abstained from voting.
The identities of which countries did not vote in the final approval have been kept secret,
so as to present a unified front of support by member states for Privacy Shield. See Stupp,
supra note 80 (noting that "a group of representatives from EU member states does not
get to hold a binding vote on the agreement").
83. Privacy Shield Program Overview, PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK,
https://www.privacyshield.gov/Program-Overview (last visited Oct. 8, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/T2F3-HEGX] (archived Sept. 21, 2017); see EU-US Privacy Shield
Becomes Operational with the GDPR on the Horizon, BIRD & BIRD (Sept. 12, 2016),
https://www.twobirds.comlen/news/articles/2016/ukleu-us-privacy-shield-becomes-
operational-with-gdpr-on-the-horizon [https://perma.cc/YY88-Y5M2] (archived Oct. 8,
2017) ("The new regime relies on a similar approach of self-certification and external
verification against seven privacy principles.").
84. See John Frank, EU-U.S. Privacy Shield: Progress for Privacy Rights, EU
POL'Y BLOG MICROSOFT (July 11, 2016),
https://blogs.microsoft.com/eupolicy/2016/07/11/eu-u-s-privacy-shield-progress-for-
privacy-rights/ [https://perma.cc/9VEE-GXV6] (archived Sept. 21, 2017) ("The successful
and rigorous negotiations also demonstrate progress between Europe and the United
States on a vital issue for transatlantic coordination.").
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agreement that honors the fundamental rights of EU citizens while
still providing a realistic standard by which companies can comply-
the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield is their latest attempt at striking this
proper balance.
A. How the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework Operates
The Privacy Shield operates in a similar fashion to Safe Harbor,
allowing companies to opt into the requirements of the Privacy Shield
by self-certifying to the DOC that they will abide by seven privacy
principles.8 5 These principles possess similar titles to Safe Harbor but
represent more demanding requirements from participating
companies. 86 The Privacy Shield Framework also includes
supplemental principles that create a wide range of obligations for the
companies implicated. 87 While entry into the Privacy Shield
framework is voluntary, once a company joins and publicly certifies its
commitment to the Privacy Shield Principles, its compliance under the
Principles is mandated.8 8
To self-certify, a company must create a "Privacy Shield-compliant
privacy policy" in line with the Privacy Shield Principles to be posted
on the company's public forum so it is accessible to EU citizens. The
Privacy Shield program is administered by the International Trade
Administration (ITA) 89 and enforced by the FTC. 90 ITA is an agency
85. See European Commission Implementing Decision pursuant to Directive
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the
protection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, C(2016) 4176 (Dec. 7, 2016),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/privacy-shield-adequacy-decision- en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/62VS-D3XJ] (archived Sept. 21, 2017) (listing the privacy principles:
Notice, Choice, Accountability for Onward Transfers, Security, Data Integrity and
Purpose Limitations, Access, Recourse Enforcement and Liability); see also EU-U.S.
Privacy Shield Framework Principles, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
https://www.privacyshield.gov/EU-US-Framework [https://perma.cc/9X34-BXRQ]
(archived Sept. 21, 2017) (the Commerce Department released the Privacy Shield
Principles pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1512, which gives the Department the "authority to
foster, promote, and develop international commerce").
86. Commission Implementing Decision, supra note 85; see also Daniel J. Solove,
GDPR, BCR, and Privacy Shield Training Requirements FAQ, TEACH PRIVACY,
https://www.teachprivacy.com/gdpr-privacy-shield-training-requirements-faq/ (last
visited Oct. 8, 2017) [https://perma.cclK6RU-5DN4] (archived Sept. 21, 2017) ("The
principles have been made stricter, especially the parts about accountability, redress,
and enforcement."); BIRD & BIRD, supra note 83.
87. See EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework Principles, supra note 85, at 11I.1-
16 (list of Privacy Shield Supplemental Principles).
88. Id. at I. § 2. ("While decisions by organizations to enter the Privacy Shield
are entirely voluntary, effective compliance is compulsory.").
89. Administration of Privacy Shield, PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK,
https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=Administration-of-Privacy-Shield (last visited
Oct. 8, 2017) [https://perma.cc/5FBS-QZJW] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
90 See Enforcement of Privacy Shield, PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK,
https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=Enforcement-of-Privacy-Shield (last visited
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within the DOC responsible for verifying that companies that opt into
the Framework satisfy their requirements for self-certification. 91
Accordingly, ITA is charged with maintaining the Privacy Shield
List-the public list of all US organizations that have declared their
commitment to adhere to the principles-which includes adding those
that have successfully certified and removing organizations that have
voluntarily withdrawn, have failed to recertify, or have shown a
pattern of failure to comply. Along with the Privacy Shield List, the
ITA has a working list of those companies that have been removed and
the reasons for their removal-all of which is available to the public.
Self-certification with the ITA is an annual process for companies
that wish to stay protected under the Privacy Shield. Companies
should be aware that even if they decide to withdraw from the Privacy
Shield list,92 the requirement to act in accordance with the Privacy
Shield Principles still attaches to any data retained as a result of
participation in the program.93 As of October 19, 2017, a total of 2,517
companies had certified under the Framework, including major
corporations like Google, Facebook,9 4 and Microsoft.9 5 US companies
have been quick to praise this new deal, saying that it protects user
privacy while allowing for the continuation of economically significant
transatlantic trade.96 Microsoft's Vice President of EU Government
Oct. 23, 2017) [https://perma.cc/8BH8-VJDB] (archived Oct. 23, 2017) (the FTC can
challenge as a deceptive practice under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C
§45, §5(a) the failure in full or in part of companies who certify under Privacy Shield.
The FTC enforcement is achieved through administrative orders or by seeking court
orders that carry penalties if violated).
91. See Administration of Privacy Shield, PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK,
https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=Administration-of-Privacy-Shield (last visited
Oct. 8, 2017) [https:/perma.cc/5FBS-QZJW] (archived Sept. 21, 2017) (detailing the
ITA's verification process for companies that opt-in to the framework).
92. See Withdrawal from Privacy Shield, PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK,
https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=Withdrawal-from-Privacy-Shield
[https://perma.cclH42Y-944T] (archived Sept. 21, 2017) (detailing the Privacy Shield
Framework withdrawal process).
93. See id. ("Your organization must continue to apply the Privacy Shield
Principles . .. otherwise, your organization must return or delete the information or
provide 'adequate' protection for information by another authorized means.").
94. James Titcomb, Facebook Signs Up to Privacy Shield Data Treaty, THE
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 16, 2016, 8:15 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/10/15/facebook-signs-up-to-privacy-shield-
data-treaty/ [https:/perma.ccl7BW8-46KB] (archived Sept. 21, 2017) (significant since
the prior EU-US agreement, Safe Harbor, was invalidated as a result of a complaint
brought before the CJEU against Facebook).
95. See Privacy Shield List, PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK,
https://www.privacyshield.gov/list (last visited Oct. 8, 2017) [https://perma.cc/7ZQP-
LXRJ] (archived Sept. 21, 2017) (list of companies certified under the framework).
96. Amar Toor, EU-US Privacy Shield Agreement Goes Into Effect: Tech
Companies Welcome New Data Transfer Agreement, But Activists Say it Doesn't Do
Enough to Protect Privacy, THE VERGE (July 12, 2016, 5:03 AM),
http://www.theverge.com/2016/7/12/12158214/eu-us-privacy-shield-data-transfer-
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Affairs believes the Privacy Shield properly meets the EU's data
protection rules.97
B. Improvements in the Privacy Shield
Even those most critical of the Privacy Shield concede that it is an
improvement in many respects over its predecessor.9 8 The EU-U.S.
Privacy Shield provides enhanced protections to EU data subjects
through three general avenues: comprehensive data protection, user-
friendly redress mechanisms that are accessible to EU citizens, and
hands-on oversight by US authorities to ensure compliance and
enforcement.
1. Data Protection Mechanisms
The Privacy Shield provides for more restrained processing and
usage of EU data, specifically via more strenuous requirements on data
retention and minimization. Under the Privacy Shield, US companies
are constrained by two principles: (1) data retention, which prohibits
the retention of personal data for an excessive time, and (2) data
minimization, which permits companies to receive and process data
only for a specifically stated purpose and bars them from retaining
such data for any longer than needed for that specific purpose.9 9 If a
company does keep data longer than specified, there must be a
legitimate reason, like "archiving for public interest, journalism,
literature and art, scientific or historical research, or for statistical
analysis."100
Another area of added protection under the Privacy Shield
concerns the onward transfers of EU data to third parties that may or
may not have independently opted in to the Framework.ioi Under the
old agreement, a US business did not have to provide notice and choice
to EU data subjects if the transfer was to an agent of the company.0 2
privacy [https://perma.cclY93V-96AP] (archived Sept. 21, 2017) ("Tech companies have
welcomed the new deal, saying that it protects user privacy while allowing for trans-
Atlantic trade.").
97. Frank, supra note 84.
98. See Opinion 01/2016, supra note 77, at 2 (WP29 admitted that Privacy Shield
was better than old Safe Harbor agreement).
99. See EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework Principles, supra note 85, at II.5
(describing data integrity and purpose limitations under the framework).
100. See id. (noting that if your data is kept for an extended purpose for any of
the listed reasons the company is still required to comply with the Privacy Principles).
101. See id. at 11.3 (describing accountability for onward transfer principal under
the new Privacy Shield).
102. How Does Safe Harbor Compare to the EU-US Privacy Shield?, ONLINE
TECH, http://www.onlinetech.com/resources/references/how-does-safe-harbor-compare-
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Organizations participating in the Privacy Shield conversely must
ensure that any transfer of data to another company is properly
protected.103 If the third party cannot adequately protect the data, the
transfers must cease.104 Whether the onward transfer is to a third
party acting as a controller 0 5 or as an agent,106 a Privacy Shield
company must contract with the third party and ensure that they
provide the same level of protection as the original self-certified
entity.10 7
In addition to its impact on US companies, the Privacy Shield
grants EU data subjects with new affirmative rights concerning the
protection of their data. First, if a company under the Framework
wishes to use the data for a purpose different than the one originally
intended, EU citizens have the right to opt out of the continued usage
of their data.1 08 Additionally, EU citizens now have the right to amend
misstatements in their personal data-the data subject can request
to-the-eu-us-privacy-shield (last visited Oct. 8, 2017) [https://perma.cclVTU7-89PE]
(archived Sept. 21, 2017).
103. See Final Privacy Shield: How it Changed and What It Means for Businesses,
LEXOLOGY (July 19, 2016), http://www.lexology.com/library/ detail.aspx?g-f403d783-
6396-4508-8eed-dalbl65fe56e [https://perma.cc/7BDL-ZGA9] (archived Sept. 21, 2017)
(explaining that companies transferring data to third parties under the Privacy Shield
framework will have to include more specific contractual obligations than previously
required by the Safe Harbor).
104. See id. (discussing the tightened conditions for third party data sharing).
105. GUIDE TO THE EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD, supra note 4, at 11 (defining a
controller as a company that itself decides how to use the data). Data controllers are
required to give notice and choice to a data subject and enter into a contract with the
third party ensuring that the processing of EU personal information will be limited and
for specific purposes in line with the consent given and that the third party will abide by
the Privacy Principles. The contract should also require the third party to notify the
Privacy Shield organization if it can no longer meet such requirement, at which time
processing of EU data must cease. EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework Key New
Requirements, PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK, https://www.privacyshield.govKey-New-
Requirements (last visited Oct. 8, 2017) [https://perma.cclD8VM-M937] (archived Sept.
21, 2017).
106. GUIDE TO THE EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD, supra note 4, at 11 (explaining that
an agent is often needed to fulfill a service contract with a sub-processor). A Privacy
Shield company faces stricter requirements to ensure that an agent ransfers for limited
purposes, provides at least equivalent protection as that required by the principles,
notifies the Privacy Shield company in case of inability to provide requisite protection
and takes reasonable steps to remediate. If the agent fails to properly protect data
subjects, the Privacy Shield company can be liable. EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework
Key New Requirements, supra note 105.
107. See GUIDE TO THE EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD, supra note 4, at 11 (including
that third parties ensure their usage and processing of data is limited and that they
provide notice and cease usage of the data if they are unable to provide the requisite
protection).
108. See Safe Harbor Replacement EU- US Privacy Shield Approved, THE NAT'L L.
REV. (July, 12, 2016), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/safe-harbor-replacement-eu-
us-privacy-shield-approved [https://perma.cc/2QNX-KLEP] (archived Sept. 22, 2017)
(recognizing that often EU data will be processed for the primary purpose of a business
and then additionally used in direct marketing purposes).
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that a company amend or remove personal data that is inaccurate,
outdated, or being handled in a way that violates the Privacy Shield.109
Further, under the new Framework, data subjects have a right to know
if their information is being processed-if a data subject makes contact
with a company, the company is obligated to confirm whether or not
they possess the individual's data within a reasonable time frame.110
2. Redress Mechanisms
The CJEU cited the lack of accessible modes of redress for EU data
subjects as a rationale for striking down Safe Harbor in Schrems v.
Data Protection Commission. The DOC and EC acknowledged this
weakness and instituted multiple venues in which EU citizens may file
complaints and seek remedy under the Privacy Shield.11 Companies
that want to certify under the Privacy Shield are required to provide
free and user-friendly dispute resolution.112 EU citizens may choose
whether to bring a complaint and in what form to file their claim.'13 If
a complaint is brought directly to the US company, the company must
respond promptly to the individual, providing an independent recourse
mechanism by which the EU data subject's complaint can be fairly
investigated and resolved."4 If an EU citizen prefers to submit her
complaint to the DPA 'within the EU, the ITA assumes the
responsibility for review and facilitation of a resolution."15
109. See EU-US Privacy Shield Framework Principles, supra note 85, at 11.6
(explaining that EU data subjects "must have access to personal information about them
... and be able to correct, amend, or delete that information where it is inaccurate"); see
also GUIDE TO THE EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD, supra note 4, at 11 (detailing that U.S.
companies have to respond to data subject's access request "within a reasonable time
frame," but a limit to this requirement might be if access would "breach professional
privilege or conflict with legal obligations").
110. GUIDE TO THE EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD, supra note 4, at 11.
111. See EU-US Privacy Shield Framework Principles, supra note 85, at 11.7
(Recourse, Enforcement and Liability Principles); GUIDE TO THE EU-U.S. PRIVACY
SHIELD, supra note 4, at 10, 12 (detailing several means of lodging a complaint under
Privacy Shield).
112. See EU-US Privacy Shield Framework Principles, supra note 85, at 111.11
(Dispute Resolution and Enforcement).
113. An individual has several possibilities to lodge a complaint, including: with
the company itself, through an independent resource mechanism like Alternative
Dispute Resolution, review by a national Data Protection Authority (DPA), through the
DOC, FTC, or Privacy Shield Panel (after other redress options have been attempted).
See GUIDE TO THE EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD, supra note 4, at 15.
114. Id.
115. Id. But see Article 29 Working Party Statement on the Decision of the
European Commission on the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (July 26, 2017),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/press-material/press-
release/art29_press-material/2016/20160726_wp29_wp-statement-euusprivacy-shiel
d~en.pdf [https://perma.cclV58A-76U8] (archived Oct. 8, 2017) [hereinafter WP 29
Statement] (noting that a major concern for the EU is that U.S. enforcement is not
mandated by any binding transnational legal source).
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If these recourse mechanisms prove insufficient, a company must
commit to binding arbitration, the process for which is explicitly laid
out in an annex to the Framework.1 16 The Privacy Shield not only
greatly expands the explicit remedial rights of EU citizens, but
importantly provides clear guidance for all involved on how to go about
the exercise of redress actions.1 17
Another grievance the CJEU voiced when striking down Safe
Harbor was the lack of restraint on US surveillance of EU data. While
this issue is still a source of contention in the new Privacy Shield, the
agreement does provide EU citizens with the possibility of redress.11 8
This may be available in situations where an individual's personal data
is accessed for a purpose beyond what is necessary for pursuing public
interest objectives like national security or law enforcement."9 This
new protection was made possible by President Obama's adoption of
the Judicial Redress Act, which extended protections under the 1974
Privacy Act to citizens of the European Union.120 Additionally, the
determination of necessity is judged by a newly created
ombudsperson.121 This is a significant addition to the Privacy Shield
116. See EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework Principles, supra note 85, at Annex
I (Binding Arbitration) §§ A-H (details scope, available remedies, pre-arbitration
requirements, binding nature, review and enforcement, the arbitration panel,
procedures and costs).
117. See GUIDE TO THE EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD, supra note 4, at 15-16 (noting
all the ways that a data subject can lodge a complaint: (1) U.S. Privacy Shield Company;
(2) Independent ADR body; (3) National Data Protection Authority; (4) Department of
Commerce; (5) Federal Trade Commission; (6) Privacy Shield (Arbitral) Panel).
118. Though the Privacy Shield ensures US authorities will have limited access
to EU citizen's data, letters from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and
Department of Justice outline the safeguards and limitations applicable to guard EU
data from US national security authorities and law enforcement. See Letter from Robert
S. Litt, Office of the Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, Office of Gen. Counsel, to Justin S.
Antonipillai, Counselor, U.S. Dep't of Commerce & Ted Dean, Deputy Assistant Sec'y,
Int'l Trade Admin. (Feb. 22, 2016),
https://www.privacyshield.gov/servlet/servlet.FileDownload?file=015t00000004qlF
[https://perma.cc/T5QC-LRLV] (archived Sept. 22, 2017); Letter from Bruce C. Swartz,
Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. and Counselor for Int'l Affairs, Dep't of Justice, to Justin
S. Antonipillai, Counselor, U.S. Dep't of Commerce & Ted Dean, Deputy Assistant Sec'y,
Int'l Trade Admin. (Feb. 19, 2016),
https://www.privacyshield.gov/servlet/servlet.FileDownload?file=015tOO000004qOW
[https://perma.cclG8RH-JHWZ] (archived Sept. 22, 2017).
119. See Litt, supra note 118; Swartz, supra note 118 (discussing access
limitations on data obtained for law enforcement or public interest purposes).
120. Allison Callahan-Slaughter, Lipstick on a Pig: The Future of Transatlantic
Data Flow Between the EU and the United States, 25 TuL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 239, 254
(2016); Voss, supra note 32.
121. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ANNEX A: EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD OMBUDSPERSON
MECHANISM REGARDING SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE,
https://www.privacyshield.gov/servlet/servlet.FileDownload?file=015tOOOOOO4qOg (last
visited Oct. 8, 2017) [https://perma.cc/6VN4-ZDDR] (archived Oct. 8, 2017) ; see Letter
from John F. Kerry, Sec'y of State, to Wra JourovA , Comm'r for Justice, Consumers and
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framework in that a new entity was created to ensure that the US
government is keeping its pledge to not excessively use EU citizens'
data, which has been a major concern for many in the European Union
following the Snowden revelations. 122 Though a step in the right
direction, it remains to be seen whether this remedial action alone win
be sufficient to pacify the concerns of the EC and to withstand a
challenge by the CJEU.
3. Oversight Mechanisms
With commitments from the DOC,s2 3 the FTC,124 the DOT,' 2 5 the
Office of National Intelligence,126 the Department of State,127 and the
Department of Justice,128 the United States is going to great lengths
to convince the EC of its intent to ensure US companies' compliance
with the Framework and its principles. While the FTC's role in
enforcing Privacy Shield is largely identical to its role in Safe Harbor,
the agency appears to be taking its enforcement role more seriously.
On September 8, 2017, the FTC released a statement that it settled
charges against three US companies that had represented to
consumers that they were participating in the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield
despite their respective failures to complete the certification process.129
Gender Equality, European Comm'n (July 7, 2016) (memorializing the agreement
reached regarding the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield and the ombudsperson mechanism).
122. See GUIDE TO THE EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD, supra note 4, at 13 (discussing
the Privacy Shield Framework's implementation of the Ombudsman mechanism). But
see WP 29 Statement, supra note 115, at 1 (recognizing that this independent review
mechanism is still a component of the US government, there is no true binding
component).
123. See Letter from Penny Priztker, Sec'y of Commerce, to Vra Jourov,
Comm'r for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, European Comm'n (July 7, 2016)
(transmitting the Privacy Shield Package).
124. See Letter from Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, to Vra
Jourovd, Comm'r for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, European Comm'n (July
7, 2016) (describing its enforcement of Privacy Shield).
125. See Letter from Anthony R. Foxx, Sec'y of Transp., Dep't of Transp., to Wra
Jourov6, Comm'r for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, European Comm'n (Feb.
19, 2016) (describing its enforcement of the Privacy Shield).
126. See Litt, supra note 118 (detailing PPD-28 and U.S. surveillance law).
127. See Kerry, supra note 121 (describing the new "Ombudsperson mechanism
through which authorities in the EU will be able to submit requests on behalf of EU
individuals regarding U.S. signals intelligence practices").
128. See Swartz, supra note 118 (noting DOJ outline of safeguards and limitations
on U.S. Government access for law enforcement and public interest purposes).
129. See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Three Companies Agree to
Settle FTC Charges They Falsely Claimed Participation in EU-US Privacy Shield
Framework (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2017/09/three-companies-agree-settle-ftc-charges-they-falsely-
claimed?utm-source=govdelivery [https://perma.cc/G3J5-KMPBI (archived Oct. 19,
2017) (the three companies, Decusoft LCC, Tru Communications, Inc. (operating under
the name TCPrinting.net), and Md7, LLC, are prohibited from misrepresenting their
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Many view this enforcement action during Privacy Shield's infancy as
"highlighting the FTC's commitment to aggressively enforcing the
Privacy Shield .... "130
The new agreement creates a more hands-on role for the ITA in
motioning and supervising compliance under the agreement. 131
Beyond the annual recertification process created originally in Safe
Harbor, the ITA will now conduct ex officio compliance reviews via
detailed questionnaires and will investigate companies that leave or
fail to recertify under the Privacy Shield.132 While this represents a
significant commitment of US government resources to the
enforcement of the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, it is important to recognize
that these new commitments are not compulsory and do not provide
the same motivational capital for compliance that might encourage US
companies to certify and abide by the privacy principles.
Another novel feature of the new EU-U.S. Privacy Shield is annual
joint review by both the DOC and the EC.' 33 This revisionary meeting
ensures the Framework is working properly and allows for
amendments if necessary. The ability to continually evolve the
agreement as technology and the political climates of the European
Union and the United States change is a dexterous addition.134 it
should be stressed that the first annual joint review in September 2017
provided more information concerning whether the Privacy Shield will
endure as a lasting transnational agreement or face a similar fate to
Safe Harbor.'3 5
compliance under any government data or privacy programs and must comply with FTC
reporting requirements as conditions of their settlement).
130. See id. (Acting FTC Chairman Maureen K. Ohlhausen further emphasized
that "[c]ompanies that want to benefit from these agreements must keep their promises
or [FTC] will hold them accountable").
131. See Administration of Privacy Shield, PRIVACY SHIELD PROGRAM,
https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=Administration-of-Privacy-Shield
[https://perma.cc/P4NF-SBT8] (archived Sept. 24, 2017) (explaining ITA's role under the
Privacy Shield program).
132. Sotirios Petrovas & Cynthia J. Rich, Privacy Shield us. Safe Harbor: A




compare-to-the-eu-us-privacy-shield [https://perma.cc.KG4X-XQMV] (archived Sept. 22,
2017).
133. See European Commission Implementing Decision EU 2016/1250, 2016 O.J.
(C 207) 1 (detailing how the Annual Joint Review will be performed and who will
participate).
134. Safe Harbor Replacement EU-US Privacy Shield Approved, supra note 108.
135. See infra Part V.A (discussing the Annual Joint Review).
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C. Remaining Weaknesses and Potential Issues Threatening the
Privacy Shield
Though the improvements discussed above address some of the
concerns cited by the CJEU, they by no means immunize the Privacy
Shield from challenge or from the threat of invalidation. Looking
critically at the new framework, not only is there still a strong threat
that EU data will be subjected to US surveillance, but there are
additional external variables in the backdrop that serve to threaten the
vitality of the Privacy Shield.
1. Lack of Protection from US Surveillance
Many in the European Union are still concerned that the EU-U.S.
Privacy Shield does not provide sufficient restrictions on US
surveillance actions. Following the CJEU's invalidation of Safe
Harbor, the WP29 issued guidance on the extent of permissible
interference with a data subject's fundamental right o privacy in the
name of surveillance when transferring data. 136 The European
Essential Guarantees are domestic EU standards established by the
WP29 to help define what permissible interferences should look like in
a democratic society.1 37 Although these principles do not directly apply
to the United States, the WP29 used the European Essential
Guarantees for data transfers in their Opinion 01/2016 to assess the
adequacy of the Privacy Shield protections. 138 While the WP29
acknowledges the increased transparency offered by the US
Administration and the verbal commitment of the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence (ODNI) to not indiscriminately collect personal
data, it still highlights the absence of any concrete assurance within
the Privacy Shield text that the practice will not take place.13 9 The
136. See generally Opinion 01/2016, supra note 77, at 11 ("The WP29 stresses that
any interference with the fundamental rights to private life and data protection need to
be justifiable in a democratic society.").
137. The Four European Essential Guarantees: 1. Processing should be clear,
precise and accessible rules; 2. Necessity and proportionality with regard to the
legitimate objectives pursued needs to be demonstrated; 3. An independent oversight
mechanism should exist; 4. Effective Remedies need to be available to the individual. See
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document 01/2016 (European
Essential Guarantees) (Apr. 13, 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2016/wp237_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9BT2-P6FM] (archived Sept. 22, 2017).
138. Opinion 01/2016, supra note 77, at 4.
139. See id.; WP 29 Statement, supra note 115, at 1; Danny O'Brien & Rainey
Reitman, The Privacy Shield is Riddled with Surveillance Holes, ELECTRONIc FRONTIER
FOUNDATION (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/03/privacy-shield-
riddled-surveillance-holes [https://perma.cc/9KAU-M2YX] (archived Sept. 22, 2017)
(arguing that the Privacy Shield does not actually prevent the collection of EU data by
U.S. intelligence agencies).
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WP29's long-standing position has been that such massive and
indiscriminate surveillance can never be proportionate or strictly
necessary in a democratic society, which the European Essential
Guidelines require to properly protect fundamental rights.140 It is
unclear if the CJEU will follow the WP29's rationale and hold that the
verbal commitment o stop indiscriminate and bulk collection of data
by the ODNI is insufficient.
While the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield did create a new redress option
for EU data subjects, satisfying the remedies element of the European
Essential Guarantees, the fficacy of this mechanism remains to be
seen. 141 The WP29 celebrated the creation of an ombudsperson to
evaluate when US surveillance goes beyond what is necessary for
legitimate purposes, but it remained skeptical whether the position can
be both independent and vested with significant power to provide
adequate redress.142 The WP29 expressed the wish that the Privacy
Shield had included more explicit guarantees concerning the
independence and authority of the ombudsperson.143 Only time will
show the efficacy and autonomy of the ombudsperson and whether the
presence of a redress mechanism will be sufficient to appease the
CJEU without more explicit corresponding limitations on bulk
collection.
2. External Factors
Looking outside the four corners of the agreement, an additional
examination of external factors in both the United States and the
European Union exposes further weaknesses in the new Framework.
i. US Political Climate: Trump Administration
The 2016 US presidential election has created additional
uncertainty about the future of the Privacy Shield, with some critics
concerned about the new administration's intent to honor US promises.
One of President Trump's first executive orders, "Enhancing Public
Safety in the Interior of the United States," directed US agencies to
"ensure that their privacy policies exclude persons who are not United
States citizens or lawful permanent residents from the protections of
the Privacy Act regarding personally identifiable information." 144
While this caused a frenzy of speculation about the future of the
140. Opinion 01/2016, supra note 77, at 4.
141. Id. at 3-4.
142. Id. at 4.
143. See WP 29 Statement, supra note 115, at 1 (stating that the WP29 would
have expected stricter guarantees concerning the independence and the powers of the
Ombudsperson mechanism).
144. Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, § 14 (Jan. 25, 2017).
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Privacy Shield, the EC has asserted that the executive order should
not impact the current agreement.145 The EU-U.S. Privacy Shield and
U.S. Privacy Act implicated within Trump's Executive Order are not
mutually dependent instruments, and the Privacy Shield "does not rely
on the protections under the U.S. Privacy Act." 146 Rather, the EC
asserts that the Privacy Shield is based on the combination of "U.S.
domestic law, international commitments, the Privacy Shield
Principles, and an EC Decision of Adequacy."1 4 7
It remains unclear whether the Executive Order will directly
impact the Privacy Shield. However, the Order reflects the new
administration's position on transnational data privacy and suggests
that the administration may take action that could jeopardize the data
transfer agreement in the future. 148 The contrast between this
executive order and those signed by President Obama1 4 9 suggests that
the two administrations have different approaches to transatlantic
data transfers. In response, EU Commissioner for Justice, Consumers,
and Gender Equality Vra Jourovd has stated that she intends to
ensure that the United States upholds a "culture of privacy" and that
it follows through on commitments regarding US law enforcement and
surveillance activities. 150 Only time will tell if the new Trump
administration is committed to the Privacy Shield.
145. See Jan Phillip Albrecht (@JanAlbrecht), TWITTER (Jan. 26, 2017, 1:45 AM),
https://twitter.com/JanAlbrecht/status/824553962678390784 [https://perma.cclCJX8-
FFTY] (archived Sept. 23, 2017) ("If this is true [Trump's Executive Order]
@EUCommission has to immediately suspend #PrivacyShield & sanction the US
for breaking EU-US umbrella agreement. #CPDP2017.").
146. Natasha Lomas, Trump Order Strips Privacy Rights from Non-U.S. Citizens,
Could Nix EU-US Data Flows, TECH CRUNCH (Jan. 26, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/01/26/trump-order-strips-privacy-rights-from-non-u-s-
citizens-could-nix-eu-us-data-flows/ [https://perma.ccHW9H-9ZMZ] (archived Sept. 23,
2017).
147. Phil Bradley-Schmieg & David Bender, European Commission Dismisses
Privacy Shield Concerns Over Trump Executive Order, INSIDE PRIVACY COVINGTON (Jan.
27, 2017), https://www.insideprivacy.com/internationalleuropean-union/european-
commission-dismisses-privacy-shield-concerns-over-trump-executive-order/
[https://perma.cclN73Z-BVP9] (archived Sept. 23, 2017).
148. See Phil Muncaster, Trump Order Sparks Privacy Shield Fears,
INFOSECURITY MAGAZINE (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.infosecurity-
magazine.com/news/trump-order-sparks-privacy-shield/ [https://perma.cclKFJ6-BGMD]
(archived Sept. 23, 2017) (predicting that the Trump administration's 'America First'
policies could jeopardize the data sharing agreement).
149. See Lomas, supra note 146 (noting that Obama's E.O. called for the limiting
of U.S. agencies' surveillance to protect the privacy and civil liberties of all persons,
whatever their nationality, and regardless of where they might reside).
150. See EU Commissioner Plans to Assess U.S. Privacy Shield Commitments,
THE NAT'L L. REV. (Jan. 14, 2017), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/eu-
commissioner-plans-to-assess-us-privacy-shield-commitments [https://perma.cc/7ZF4-
2H56] (archived Sept. 23, 2017) ("JourovA indicated that she would seek to ensure that
the U.S. maintains a 'culture of privacy' under the new administration, and that the U.S.
government would continue to adhere to its commitments with regard to U.S. law
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Another concern in the wake of the Trump election is whether
President Obama's 2014 Presidential Policy Directive 28 (PPD-28) will
be preserved. 151 PPD-28 is "a keystone underlying support for the
Privacy Shield," and has a binding effect on US intelligence
agencies.152 It requires that intelligence agencies' collection and access
to EU personal data be "as tailored as feasible," rather than
"generalized." 153 This Directive legitimately limits such agencies'
ability to engage in bulk collection, which is a source of major concern
of the CJEU and EU citizens surrounding the adequacy of the Privacy
Shield.154 However, the new CIA Director, Mike Pompeo, has spoken
directly against such limitations on US surveillance powers.155 This,
enforcement and surveillance activities that were included within the Privacy Shield
framework.").
151. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Presidential Policy Directive-
Signals Intelligence Activities, Policy Directive/PPD-28 (Jan. 17, 2014),
http://go.wh.gov/WWipZM [https://perma.cclPD9Q-RVTV] (archived Sept. 23, 2017)
(stating that PPD-28 holds that signals intelligence activities must be conducted in such
a way that ensures all persons [are] treated with dignity and respect, regardless of their
nationality or wherever they might reside, and that all persons have legitimate privacy
interest in the handing of their personal information); EU and U.S. Release Terms of




f [https://perma.cc/CXK9-VFFM]1 (archived Oct. 8, 2017) (noting the concerns of EU
citizens regarding potential breaches of binding commitments by the U.S. government).
152. See Jones Day, supra note 151 (the Privacy Shield incorporates Presidential
Policy Directive 28 ("PPD-28")'s binding effect on U.S. intelligence agencies); Cameron
Kerry & Alan Charles Raul, The Economic Case for Preserving PPD-28 and Privacy
Shield, LAWFARE (Jan. 12, 2017), https://lawfareblog.comleconomic-case-preserving-
ppd-28-and-privacy-shield [https://perma.ccN6CL-DSKB] (archived Sept. 23, 2017)
(acknowledging that PPD-28 protects the privacy interests of innocent foreigners whose
electronic communications are scooped up by NSA merely as incidental collections to the
agency's actual targeting of malicious individuals).
153. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, supra note 151 ("In determining
whether to collect signals intelligence, the [U.S.] shall consider availability of other
information . . . appropriate and feasible alternatives to signals intelligence should be
prioritized."); see also Jones Day, supra note 151 ("PPD-28 requires collection and access
to EU personal data by U.S. intelligence agencies to be 'as tailored as feasible' rather
than carried out on a 'generalized basis."').
154. See Jones Day, supra note 151 (explaining that PPD-28 has a binding effect
on U.S. intelligence agencies); supra Part III.B (examining CJEU concerns about Safe
Harbor included lack of surveillance protections); supra Part IV.C.1 (recognizing that
one weakness that still remains in new Privacy Shield agreement is access to EU Data
by U.S. Intelligence authorities); see also Kerry & Raul, supra note 152 (predicting that
a revocation of PPD-28 would undercut the Privacy Shield Framework and likely lead to
its suspension).
155. See Adam Klein, Surveillance Policy in a Trump Administration, LAWFARE
(Dec. 22, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/surveillance-policy-trump-
administration [https://perma.cclTH5K-3W95] (archived Sept. 23, 2017) (pointing out
that Mike Pompeo challenged Obama-era surveillance policy in several ways, but also
emphasized the importance of building enduring public support for surveillance
activities on a bipartisan basis).
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paired with recent executive orders, shows a diminished concern for
data privacy.156
In late March, Commissioner Jourovd visited Washington D.C. to
speak with US authorities about the state of the Privacy Shield,
seeking reassurances that despite concerning US policy, the new
administration was committed to the transatlantic agreement. 157
Meetings included sit-downs with U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilber
Ross and Attorney General Jeff Sessions, as well as discussions with
various US companies and privacy NGOs.15 8 Following her meetings,
Commissioner Jourovi spoke at the Center for Strategic &
International Studies, stressing the need to limit government access to
personal data and to ensure adequate oversight of companies'
compliance. 159 Despite Commissioner Jourov.'s positive tweets
regarding her US travels, 160 not all European regulators were
convinced.161
Privacy Shield critics became even more apprehensive on April 4,
2017, when President Trump signed a Congressional Resolution
rescinding an Obama-era rule that required internet service providers
156. See id. (noting that Pompeo and Jeff Sessions have both supported bulk
collection of communications metadata).
157. See Stephanie Bodoni, If Trump Spoils Privacy Pact, We'll Pull It, EU Official
Warns, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Mar. 2, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-02/if-trump-spbils-privacy-pact-we-
11-pull-it-eu-official-warns [https://perma.cc/EJA5-7MJR] (archived Sept. 23, 2017)
(Commissioner Jourova stated prior to her trip that "If there is a significant change, we
will suspend . . . I will not hesitate to do it. There's too much at stake").
158. See Li Zhou et al., EU antitrust, privacy regulators visit D.C., POLITICO (Mar.
29, 2017), http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning-techl2017/03/eu-antitrus-privacy-
regulators-visit-dc-219486 [https://perma.cc/KS6Z-SYVB] (archived Sept. 23, 2017)
(tracking Jourova's meetings during her visit).
159. Vora Jourovd, European Comm'r for Justice, Speech at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (Mar. 31, 2017),
https://ec.europa.eulcommission/commissioners/2014-
2019/jourovalannouncements/speech-commissioner-jourova-event-organized-center-
strategic-and-international-studies en [https://perma.cc/23G6-ZDB8] (archived Sept.
30, 2017).
160. See Vora JourovA (@VeraJourova), TWITTER (March 30, 2017),
https://twitter.com/VeraJourovalstatus/847451968067047424 [https://perma.cc/8KDL-
F5WW] (archived Sept. 23, 2017) ("Good first meeting w/ @USAGSessions Attorney
General of the United States. EU - US cooperation is crucial, especially on criminal
justice"); Vora JourovA (@VeraJourova), TWITTER (March.30, 2017),
https://twitter.com/VeraJourovalstatus/847540721360015360 [https://perma.cc/5JA6-
YUM5] (archived Sept. 23, 2017) ("good meeting w/ @SecretaryRoss, U.S. Secretary of
Commerce to discuss #PrivacyShield. #dataprotection creates trust for data flows #EU
to #US").
161. See Catherine Stupp, MEPs want Commission to toughen up Privacy Shield
under Trump, EURACTIV.CoM (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.euractiv.com/section/data-
protection/news/meps-want-commission-to-toughen-up-privacy-shield-under-trump/
[https://perma.cc/Q99M-GP88] (archived Sept. 23, 2017) (acknowledging that
Commissioner Jourova's Washington visit didn't calm all anxiety surrounding the
Trump Administration, evident by the MEPs resolution on April 6, 2017).
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(ISPs) to seek customer permission before using their browsing history
for marketing purposes.162 While the repeal has no direct impact on
the Privacy Shield or on EU data subjects, the resolution added to
concerns generally about the United States' commitment to privacy.'6 3
Two days later, on April 6, 2017, the European Parliament passed a
resolution on the adequacy of Privacy Shield protection, formally
expressing concern about the Trump administration's commitment to
upholding the Privacy Shield Principles.164
The Resolution lists a number of lingering concerns from MEPs
and includes an agenda for the EC with talking points for the
September 2017 Annual Review. 165 MEPs' criticisms include the
voluntary nature of the agreement, 166 the unclear scope of the right to
object,16 7 the lack of explicit principles addressing the Privacy Shield's
application to processors or agents,'68 and the small number of US
companies that use an EU DPA for the dispute resolution
mechanism.169 Further, the MEPs noted that bulk collection is still
possible so long as it is "as tailored as feasible" and "reasonable," which
is more lax than the necessity and proportionality requirements
mandated in the EU Charter.170 The Resolution also "deplores" that
bulk surveillance is still permissible for law enforcement purposes
under the Privacy Shield without any explicit mode of judicial
redress.'71
162. See George Lynch, FCC Rule Repeal Darkens EU View of U.S. Privacy
Commitments, BLOOMBERG L.: PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY (Apr. 27, 2017),
https://www.bna.com/fc-rule-repeal-n57982087235/ [https://perma.cc/28GY-7R66]
(archived Sept. 23, 2017) (noting that, practically, the repeal of the rule means that ISPs
can continue to sell customers' data without their consent).
163. See id. ("The new concerns over the commitment of the U.S. to privacy come
during the ramp-up to the first annual review of the EU-U.S.").
164. See Resolution of 6 April 2017 on the adequacy of the protection afforded by
the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, EUR. PARL. DOc. 2016/3018 (RSP); see also Press Release,
European Union, Privacy Shield: MEPs alarmed at undermining safeguards in the US
(Apr. 6, 2017) (noting that .the resolution was introduced by the Committee on Civil
Liberties, Justice & Home Affairs and passed 306 votes to 240 votes with 40 abstentions).
165. See Resolution of 6 April 2017, supra note 164 (reiterating the call on the
Commission to seek clarification on the legal status of the 'written assurances' provided
by the US and to ensure that any commitment or arrangement foreseen under the
Privacy Shield is maintained following the taking up of office of a new administration in
the United States).
166. Id. ¶ 3.
167. Id. 1 12.
168. Id. 1 15.
169. Id. 1 14.
170. See id. 1 16 (calling for a uniform definition of bulk surveillance linked to
the European understanding of the term, where evaluation is not made dependent on
selection).
171. See id. 11 19, 26 ("Deplores the fact that neither the Privacy Shield
Principles nor the letters of the U.S. administration providing clarifications and
assurances demonstrate the existence of effective judicial redress rights for individuals
in the EU whose personal data are transferred to a US organisation under the Privacy
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Additionally, the Resolution specifically addresses troubling US
domestic policy. It characterizes the repeal of the Federal
Communications Committee rule discussed above as "yet another
threat to privacy safeguards in the United States."172 Further, it
"[expresses] great concern" over the NSA's "Procedures for the
Availability or Dissemination of Raw Signals Intelligence
Information," which permits sharing of private data without warrants
amongst sixteen US agencies.'73 It also challenges the independence of
the ombudsperson'7 4 and calls on the EC to assess the impact of
President Trump's Executive Order on European citizens.175
The Resolution outlines points of clarification to be addressed
during the Annual Review. These include: (1) confirming that the
Privacy Shield will comply with the GDPR, EU 2016/679, which takes
effect May 2018,176 (2) seeking reassurances from US authorities that
their written assurances will be maintained under the new
administration, 177 and (3) ensuring that all mechanisms and
safeguards touted by the US administration are being implemented
and adequately protect data subjects.'78
ii. EU Political Climate: Brexit
The political climate in the European Union further complicates
the future of the Privacy Shield. Notably, there is uncertainty within
the European Union surrounding Brexit's impact on the Privacy Shield
Shield Principles and further accessed and processed by US public authorities for law
enforcement and public interest purposes.").
172. Id. ¶ 22.
173. See id. ¶ 23 (stating concern that an individual affected by a breach of the
rules can apply only for information and for the data to be deleted and/or for a stop to
further processing, but has no right to compensation).
174. See id. ¶ 27 (stating that the Ombudsperson mechanism set up by the U.S.
Department of State is not sufficiently independent and is not vested with sufficient
effective powers to carry out its duties and provide effective redress to EU individuals).
175. See id. 1 25 (calling on the Commission to assess the impact of the Executive
Order on 'Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States', and in particular
its Section 14 on the exclusion of foreign citizens from the protections of the Privacy Act
regarding personally identifiable information, contradicting the written assurances that
judicial redress mechanisms exist for individuals in cases where data was accessed by
the US authorities).
176. See id. T 31 ("Calls on the Commission to take all the necessary measures to
ensure that the Privacy Shield will fully comply with Regulation (EU) 2016/679, to be
applied as from 16 May 2018, and with the EU Charter.").
177. See id. ¶ 8 ("Reiterates its call on the Commission to seek clarification on the
legal status of the 'written assurances' provided by the US and to ensure that any
commitment or arrangement foreseen under the Privacy Shield is maintained following
the taking up of office of a new administration in the United States.").
178. See id. ¶ 35 (calling on the Commission to evaluate meticulously whether
the mechanisms and safeguards indicated in the assurances and clarifications by the US
administration are effective and feasible).
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and on data transfers coming from the United Kingdom.17 9 Article 50
was triggered on March 29, 2017, which started the two-year clock for
the United Kingdom to negotiate an exit deal.180 If all goes according
to plan, the United Kingdom will exit the European Union and cease
to be covered under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield. An expert in data
protection from the United Kingdom postulated that the existence of
the "Privacy Shield in the UK post-Brexit is largely dependent on the
model adopted by the UK in its departure from the EU."181 Some have
speculated that the United Kingdom will follow Switzerland and adopt
a new privacy agreement with the United States independent from the
European Union.182 Alternatively, the United Kingdom may choose to
continue to act under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield as a non-member of
the European Union.183 Under this option, US companies would be
expected to comply with UK law when dealing with the personal data
of UK citizens and would no longer receive a presumption of adequacy
under the Privacy Shield, creating confusion about requisite
compliance.184 Thus, while Brexit is unlikely to directly impact the
continuing existence of the Privacy Shield, it creates another source of
uncertainty in the transatlantic data transfer arena.
179. See HM GOVERNMENT, THE EXCHANGE AND PROTECTION OF PERSONAL
DATA: A FUTURE PARTNERSHIP PAPER (2017),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/systemiuploads/attachment-data/file/639853/T
heexchange-and-protection of personal data.pdf [https://perma.cclKZ56-M36N]
(archived Sept. 23, 2017) (addressing UK's post-Brexit intentions to work with the EU
to ensure continued data flows; notably, this paper does not mention anything about data
transfers from between the UK and U.S.).
180. See 'No turning back' on Brexit as Article 50 triggered, BBC NEWS (Mar. 30,
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-39431428 [https://perma.cc/3S2X-MHRQ]
(archived Oct. 23, 2017) (noting that Prime Minister Theresa May wrote in a letter to EC
President Donald Tusk of UK's intention to withdraw from the EU); Michael Wilkinson
& Robert Midgley, What is Article 50? The Only Explanation You Need To Read, THE
TELEGRAPH (Feb. 25, 2017), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/O/what-is-article-50-the-
only-explanation-you-need-to-read/ [https://perma.cc/3DF8-UZK2] (archived Sept. 23,
2017) ("Triggering Article 50 starts the clock running. After that, the Treaties that
govern membership no longer apply to Britain.").
181. Michael Nesheiwat, Doing Business Abroad? Brexit and Its Implications On
Your Data Practices, 34 No. 7 WESTLAW J. COMPUTER AND INTERNET 1, 2-3 (Sept. 9,
2016).
182. See id. (following the example of Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway).
183. See McCann FitzGerald, Brexit: Data Protection and EU-UK Data Flows,
LEXOLOGY (Feb. 23 2017), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-dff5c8b6-a024-
4e8d-8d0a-9bc417942efa [https://perma.cc/Q5CV-BD6R] (archived Sept. 23, 2017)
("Mhe UK Government publicly stated that its Brexit goals include ensuring that, from
the Exit Date, crossborder flows of personal data between the UK and the EU could
continue on an 'unhindered' and 'uninterrupted' basis.").
184. See Nesheiwat, supra note 181, at 2-3 ("[M]any U.S. companies that do some
business in the EU, or otherwise interact with EU customers, must comply with EU data
privacy laws.").
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V. LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE: THE POSSIBLE OUTCOMES FOR THE
EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD
Unfortunately, advocates and opponents of the Framework have
no crystal ball to help predict the ultimate fate of the Privacy Shield.
The agreement has faced opposition every step of the way. Yet that
opposition has coexisted with a universal understanding of the
importance of transatlantic trade between the European Union and the
United States. Rather than providing an unsubstantiated guess as to
the outcome, this Note recognizes the challenges the agreement may
face in coming years and explores potential alternatives to the
Framework as it exists today.
A. First Privacy Shield Challenge: Annual Joint Review
On September 18 and 19, 2017 in Washington, D.C., EU
regulators had the opportunity to challenge the Privacy Shield for the
first time during the inaugural annual joint review by the EC and the
DOC. 185 In addition to the members of the EC and the DOC,
participants from the EU included: members of the WP29 and the
European Data Protection Supervisor; and from the US:
representatives from the FTC, the DOT, the Department of State, the
ODNI, and the DOJ, as well as the acting Privacy Shield
ombudsperson.18 6
Prior to the inaugural review, the EC surveyed the public opinion
to identify concerns and discussion points to address during the
September meeting. 187 The EU Commissioner circulated
questionnaires to companies that have certified under the Privacy
Shield, trade associations, and other interest groups, setting a July 5,
185. David J. Bender, First Annual Privacy Shield Review Will Comprehensively
Assess Framework, THE NAT'L L. REV. (May 17, 2017),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/first-annual-privacy-shield-review-will-
comprehensively-assess-framework [https://perma.ccY2L6-B89Z] (archived Oct. 8,
2017).
186. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on
the First Annual Review of the Functioning of the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, at 3,
COM(2017) 611 final (Oct. 18, 2017) [hereinafter Report on First Annual Review); see
also id. (noting that regulators both in the U.S. and EU are expected to closely scrutinize
the first year of Privacy Shield operation).
187. EU Commission Issues Questionnaire in Preparation for Annual Review of
Privacy Shield, HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP: PRIVACY AND INFO. SEcURITY L. BLOG (June
5, 2017), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-4313223e-c6a7-4b9a-bf8a-
32a3d6d73c20 [https://perma.cc/ZC3C-DURA] (archived Sept. 23, 2017); see also Bender,
supra note 185 (noting that regulators plan to solicit information from Privacy Shield
stakeholders, including companies that certify under the Framework and others
interested parties).
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2017 submission deadline for responses.'8 8 Prior to the review, the
agreement's execution has effectively been stayed for a year, thus the
September meeting was the first opportunity for invalidation.189
Following the review, the EC and the DOC issued a joint
statement stating that the two "share an interest in the Framework's
success and remain committed to continued collaboration to ensure it
functions as intended."19 0 On October 18, 2017, the EC issued its
conclusion that the United States "continues to ensure an adequate
level of protection for personal data transferred under the Privacy
Shield," meaning that the Privacy Shield provides the requisite level
of protection for EU data under the Directive.1 91 This is a significant
holding considering many privacy experts in the European Union and
the United States assumed the contrary.19 2 However, this adequacy
holding does not necessarily mean that the Privacy Shield is a perfect
framework in the eyes of the EC or the United States. Rather, the
decision likely stands as recognition that invalidation of the
Framework entirely would be more harmful than working within the
current arrangement and editing areas of continued concern. The
Commission conceded this in its report listing a number of
recommendations that would ensure the continuing vitality of the
Framework. 193 Implicit in the EC's holding is the recognition that
188. See EU Commission Issues Questionnaire in Preparation for Annual Review
of Privacy Shield, supra note 187 (stating that questionnaires include a variety of
questions sought to gather information about how the certification process has gone for
Privacy Shield certified companies, as well as gauge sentiments surrounding upholding
of US commitments and US domestic law impact on the vitality of the agieement).
189. See Aaron Souppouris, EU Will Watch Privacy Shield For a Year Before
Challenging, ENGADGET (July 27, 2016), https://www.engadget.com/2016/07/27/eu-data-
protection-privacy-shield-annual-review/ [https://perma.cc/ZE7D-LUSV] (archived Sept.
23, 2017) ("European regulators have announced that Privacy Shield will not be
challenged until its first annual review.").
190. Press Release, U.S. Sec'y of Commerce and EU Comm'r for Justice,
Consumers and Gender Equality, Joint Press Statement on the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield
Review (Sept. 21, 2017) (recognizing that the "Privacy Shield raised the bar for
transatlantic data protection by ensuring that participating companies and relevant
public authorities provide a high level of data protection for EU individuals").
191. Report on First Annual Review, supra note 186.
192. See US Surveillance Makes Privacy Shield Invalid, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July
26, 2017 12:01 AM EDT), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/26/us-surveillance-makes-
privacy-shield-invalid [https://perma.ce/5YXX-B6EX (archived Oct. 20, 2017) (Co-
Director of the U.S. Program at Human Rights Watch urged the EC to "take a ... hard
look at the realities of US surveillance and take action to make sure no one's rights are
sacrificed in the name of political or economic convenience."); Natasha Lomas, Europe's
DP Chiefs Fire Warning Shots Ahead of First EU-US Privacy Shield Review, TECH
CRUNCH (June 13, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/13/europes-dp-chiefs-fire-
warning-shots-ahead-of-first-eu-us-privacy-shield-review/ [https://perma.cc/9HFA-
9QA8] (archived Oct. 22, 2017) (WP29 concerns included commercial aspects and law
enforcement and national security issues); see also WP 29 Statement, supra note 115, at
1 (WP29 expressed a number of concerns about the adequacy of Privacy Shield).
193. Recommendations include:
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while the Privacy Shield today is sufficient under EU law, absent
changes in the future taking heed of the recommendations, the
Framework may not survive future reviews. In a press release issued
with the Report, the EC stated that it will collaborate with US
authorities to ensure that the recommendations are followed and that
the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield continues to work effectively.1 94
Ultimately, while the annual review and the EC's holding of
adequacy is a positive development for the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, it
does not immunize the Framework from future challenge. The
transatlantic data sharing agreement will face continued scrutiny
during future annual reviews between the EC and DOC, as well as the
threat of review by the CJEU.1 95
B. Upcoming Privacy Shield Challenge: Judicial Action by the CJEU
The CJEU itself may speak on the adequacy of the Privacy Shield,
as it did with the predecessor Safe Harbor. Over the past few years,
the CJEU has become intimately involved in questions of security and
data protection.196 At the time of this Note's submission, opponents
* 2.1 Companies should not be able to publicly refer to their Privacy Shield
certification before the certification is finalized by the DOC.
* 2.2 Proactive and regular search for false claims by the DOC
* 2.3 Ongoing monitoring of compliance with the Privacy Shield Principles by
the DOC
* 2.4 Strengthening of awareness raising
* 2.5 Improve coordination between enforcers
* 2.6 Study on automated decision-making
* 2.7 Enshrine the Protections of the PPD-28 in the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act
* 2.8 Swift appointment of the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson
* 2.9 Swift appointment of the members of the PCLOB and release of the
PCLOB report on PPD-28
* 2.10 More timely and comprehensive reporting of relevant developments by
U.S. Authorities
See Report on First Annual Review, supra note 186 (in conjunction with their holding of
adequacy, the EC also recognizes that the "practical implementation of the Privacy
Shield framework can be improved in order to ensure that the guarantees and safeguards
provided therein continue to function .... ).
194. Press Release, European Commission, EU-U.S. Privacy Shield: First review
shows it works but implementation can be improved (Oct. 18, 2017),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-17-3966_en.htm [https://perma.cc/SP93-F6JWJ
(archived Oct. 23, 2017).
195. See David Spencer, Privacy Shield Passes First Annual Review But Its Long-
Term Future Remains Uncertain, VPN COMPARE (Sept. 25, 2017),
https://www.vpncompare.co.uk/privacy-shield-passes-first-annual-review-but-its-long-
term-future-remains-uncertain/ [https://perma.cc/HS8W-ZGSN] (archived Oct. 20, 2017)
(recognizing that the future of Privacy Shield is unknown and that is a significant
consideration for why many companies are reluctant to certify under the Framework).
196. See Lauren Cerulus & Nicolas Hirst, Europe's Gavel Comes Down Hard on
Tech, POLITICO (Oct. 9, 2016), https://www.politico.eularticle/european-court-of-justice-
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have filed two legal challenges to the Privacy Shield's adequacy. First,
Digital Rights Ireland, the privacy advocacy group that helped bring
the suit that invalidated Safe Harbor, has brought a complaint in the
Luxembourg General Court (a lower court of the CJEU).19 7 It asserts
that the Commission's adequacy decision, which approved and adopted
the Privacy Shield, should be invalidated because the agreement fails
to protect the privacy rights of EU citizens.19 8 The second complaint is
by La Quadrature du Net, a French civil liberties campaign group,
asking for a similar annulment of the Privacy Shield.1 99 Both groups
must prove that the Privacy Shield is "of direct and individual concern"
to the groups in order to have standing to bring their complaints.20 0
Since both complaints are brought by civil liberties organizations, this
may be challenging.
Assuming that these organizations satisfy standing and other
procedural requirements, it may still take several years before the
question of the adequacy of the Privacy Shield reaches the CJEU.20 1
Further, even if the CJEU does hear such a case, there is no guarantee
that the court will invalidate the Privacy Shield. The CJEU could
tech-cases-uber-airbnb/ [https://perma.cc/3W9U-4Z6Y] (archived Sept. 23, 2017); see,
e.g., Case T-738/16, La Quadrature du Net and Others v. Comm'n, 2017 E.C.R. 006/49;
Case C-203/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post- och telestyrelsen, 2017 E.C.R 053/13; Case T-
670/16, Digital Rights Ireland v. Comm'n, 2016 E.C.R. 410/37; Joined Cases C-293/12 &
C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for Communications, Marine and
Natural Resources, et al. 2013 E.C.R.
197. See Privacy Shield Challenged, WHITE & CASE (Nov. 2, 2016),
http://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/eu-us-privacy-shield-challenged
[https://perma.cc/C8VN-GWFL] (archived Sept. 23, 2017) ("Digital Rights Ireland
("DRI") has filed the challenge (case number T-670/16) with Europe's second highest
court, the Luxembourg-based General Court, which is the lower court of the CJEU.");
Lauren Cerulus, Privacy Shield Data Agreement Challenged Before EU Court Digital
Advocacy Group Attempts to Get Agreement Annulled, POLITICO (Oct. 27, 2016),
http://www.politico.eularticle/privacy-shield-data-agreement-challenged-before-ecj/
[https://perma.cc/CCZ7-6DLP] (archived Sept. 23, 2017) ("Privacy advocacy group
Digital Rights Ireland has challenged the EU-U.S. data transfer agreement 'privacy
shield' before the EU's General Court.").
198. Digital Rights Ireland, 2016 E.C.R. 410/37 ("[A]1leging that the contested
decision is not in accordance with Article 25(6) of Directive 95/46, read in light of Articles
7, 8, 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union."); see also Privacy
Shield Challenged, supra note 197; Cerulus, supra note 197.
199. See La Quadrature du Net and Others, 2017 E.C.R. 006/49 ("declaring
Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 to be contrary to
Articles 7, 8, and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union");
Peter Sayer, A Second Privacy Shield Legal Challenge Increases Threat to EU-US Data
Flows, PCWORLD (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.pcworld.comlarticle/3138196/cloud-
computing/a-second-privacy-shield-legal-challenge-increases-threat-to-eu-us-data-
flows.html [https://perma.cc/6QF3-DF68] (archived Sept. 24, 2017).
200. Justine Brown, Second Group Seeks to Annul Privacy Shield, CIO DIVE (Nov.
4, 2016), https://www.ciodive.comlnews/second-group-seeks-to-annul-privacy-
shield/429745/ [https://perma.cc/3X35-6Z7J] (archived Sept. 24, 2017); Sayer, supra note
199.
201. Privacy Shield Challenged, supra note 197.
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accept the framework, which would confirm and strengthen the
European Union's adequacy decision, or issue guidance regarding any
aspects it finds problematic. 202 While the CJEU is unlikely to
invalidate the framework in the immediate future, the fact that there
are already two challenges against it suggests an uncertain future for
transatlantic personal data transfers between the European Union and
the United States. In light of the weaknesses this Note has identified
in the Privacy Shield and the propensity of the CJEU to invalidate it,
the Privacy Shield is not a secure mechanism for trade in its current
state.203
C. Alternative Mechanisms to the Privacy Shield
While the focus of this Note has been the Privacy Shield, it is not
the only mechanism by which transatlantic transfer of personal data
between the European Union and the United States can be achieved.
If the Privacy Shield is invalidated via Annual Joint Review or by the
CJEU, or if the European Union and the United States decide that a
blanket adequacy framework is unattainable, there are alternative
contrivances available to US companies.204 Absent a framework like
the Privacy Shield, data transfers can still validly occur between the
European Union and the United States through three mechanisms: (1)
unambiguous consent by the data subject to the transfer; 205 (2)
Standard Contract Clauses (SCCs), which are standard form, non-
negotiable agreements that impose contractual obligations for data
protection and are available on the EC's website;206 and (3) Binding
Corporate Rules (BCRs), which are binding self-governance rules for
multinational corporate groups that may be approved by national
DPAs upon a finding that the group's protection policy is sufficient and
applies to all group members worldwide. 207 Notwithstanding the
availability of these alternative mechanisms, many US companies still
202. See IRION ET AL., supra note 63, at 11-12 (detailing the powers of the CJEU).
203. See supra Part IV.C (explaining the weaknesses that still remain within the
Privacy Shield).
204. See Jeff Stone, Privacy Shield Seems Safe, but Have a Backup Plan, WALL
ST. J. (Mar. 22, 2017) https://www.wsj.com/articles/privacy-shield-seems-safe-but-have-
a-backup-plan- 1490214214 [https://perma.cc/APH7-C8QR] (archived Oct. 27, 2017)
(recommending that companies that certify under the Privacy Shield also use model
contract clauses as a back up plan).
205. See Lisa Mays, The Trickle Down Effect of Privacy Shield Uncertainty:
Fluctuating Lines for Anti-Bribery Compliance, 19 No. 10 J. INTERNET L. 1, 9 (2016)
(explores the various ways that absent a data sharing agreement, companies can
permissible transfer and use EU data, including "a company [can] obtain consent to the
transfer").
206. Neal Cohen, The Public Follies: A Look Back at the CJEU's Invalidation of
the EU/US Safe Harbor Framework, Case Notes, 1 EUR. DATA PROT. L. REV. 240, 243
(2015); Gutterman, supra note 61, at 1.
207. Cohen, supra note 206, at 243; Gutterman, supra note 61, at 1.
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prefer a comprehensive approach that allows certification under the
Privacy Shield.208
While unambiguous consent would grant US companies greater
flexibility in negotiating with EU data subjects, it would come at a high
administrative cost.209 Each data subject must fully and knowingly
acquiesce to the transfer on an individual basis, which is much more
taxing than simply requiring one-time self-certification and annual
recertification that deems all of a company's EU data transfers
permissible. 210 The Directive defines consent as a "specific and
informed indication of a person's wishes for data to be processed,"
which is "unambiguously" and "freely given," without "compulsion or
an act of deceit."211 In certain circumstances, like data transfers for the
purpose of human resources or employment related activities, it is
presumed that consent may not be properly given in light of the power
imbalance of the parties.212 Further, according to the WP29, a data
subject's consent "is unlikely to provide an adequate long-term
framework for data controllers in cases of repeated or even structural
transfer for the processing in question."21 3
While SCCs do not suffer from the administrative costs of
attaining individual data subjects' consent, they lack the flexibility
required to negotiate in practice.2 14 SCCs are presumed permissible
because the EC has issued explicit language for contracts that meet
208. See WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 72 (stating that many US industries
maintain that the US approach to data privacy is more nimble than the EU's policy and
thus urge comprehensive data protection legislation).
209. Lothar Determann, Brian Hengesbaugh & Michaela Weigl, The EU-U.S.
Privacy Shield Versus Other EU Data Transfer Compliance Options, BLOOMBERG BNA
(Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.bna.comleuus-privacy-shield-n57982076824/
[https://perma.cc/4WC6-8KCQ] (archived Sept. 24, 2017).
210. Id.
211. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data, art. 2, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31.
212. See Commission Regulation 2016/679 of April 27, 2016, General Data
Protection Regulation, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 2 (noting that under GDPR consent is held out
to be valid only "if freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous, and can be revoked
at any time'); Determann et al., supra note 209 (stating it is harder to ensure uniform
consent in the human resources context because the lack of direct contact between
parties does not induce data subjects to grant consent); The Honorable Julie Brill, U.S.
Fed. Trade Comm'n, Presentation to the European Institute: Safe Harbor: The Schrems
Case and What Comes Next (Oct. 20, 2015) (GDPR requires that companies expressly
disclose the risks of international data transfers; note that human resource-related
companies comprise 50% of the Safe Harbor participants).
213. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working document on a common
interpretation of Article 26(1) of Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 11 (European
Comm'n Directorate, General of Justice, Freedom, and Security, Working Paper No. 114,
2005), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protectioni/article-29/documentat6ilopinion-
recommendation/files/2005/wpll4_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZX4V-7BBY] (archived on
Sept. 24, 2017).
214. Id.; GERLACH ET AL., supra note 70, at 6.
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the requisite standards to protect EU data subjects.2 1 5 For businesses
to receive the presumption of adequacy, they cannot amend the SCC's
provisions regarding data subjects' privacy rights in any significant
manner.216 While, technically speaking, companies have the right to
edit the SCC as they wish, such alterations would be subject to review
by every EU member state and may trigger additional requirements to
notify or seek further approval from local EU authorities-
requirements that are not only costly, but eliminate the advantages of
using the SCC in the first place.2 17 Conversely, certification under a
framework like the Privacy Shield enables companies to tailor a
privacy policy to their specific purpose without sacrificing efficiency.
BCRs cover all direct and onward data transfers within a
company, including those to its subsidiaries or affiliates, and thereby
provide intragroup coverage.21 8 However, BCRs do not protect onward
data transfers to unaffiliated entities outside the company in question,
including customers, suppliers, distributers, service providers, civil
litigants, and government agencies.2 19 This is troublesome because
continued compliance is contingent upon companies either having
those entities agree to BCRs or implementing other compliance
mechanisms to protect the data-a requirement more burdensome on
US companies than the self-certification process and onward transfer
requirements under the Privacy Shield.
Further, the implementation process can take up to two years, and
the BCR specification requirements compel companies to include many
details about (1) the company's desire to transfer (including its
location, contact information, and business structure), (2) the data
transfers or set of data transfers in which the company wishes to
engage (including what kind of EU data will be implicated and what
type of data subjects), and (3) the type and purpose of processing.220
Because of the onerous approval process, BCRs are very expensive to
put in place--only one hundred companies globally and thirty in the
United States have implemented this mechanism.221 Again, compared
215. Determann et al., supra note 209; WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 72, at 14.
216. See Commission Regulation 2016/679 of 27 April 2016, supra note 212 at 6
(Presumption of adequacy under the SCC when do not alter).
217. Presumptively use SCC because don't want to have to seek out approval of
every EU member state, but if amendment o SCC in way implicates data subject privacy
right have to effectively do what you were avoiding.
218. GERLACH ET AL., supra note 70, at 6; WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 72, at 14;
Determann et al., supra note 209.
219. See Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 212, at 2 (explaining in Art.
47, paragraph 2 that a company might want to engage in onward transfer of data to an
entity that is not an affiliate of the company covered under the BCR); Determann et al.,
supra not-e09.
220. WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 72, at 14; Determann et al., supra note 209.
221. Philip L. Gordon & Tahl Tyson, What Does the European Court of Justice's
Invalidation of the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework Mean for U.S.-Based Multinational
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to the Privacy Shield's annual self-certification process, BCR
authorization is much more taxing.222
Further, there is a question as to the continuing adequacy of both
SCCs and BCRs as alternative mechanisms for compliance. 223
Following the Schrems case, the Irish Data Protection Commissioner
(DPC) noticed that Facebook was continuing to transfer personal data
in reliance on SCCs.22 4 The Irish DPC announced its intention to
initiate a direct challenge to the validity of EU SCCs, arguing that
SCCs suffer from the same weaknesses that led to the invalidation of
Safe Harbor.225 The hearing before the Irish High Court lasted over
five weeks, from February 7, 2017 to March 15, 2017, with the Irish
DPC asking the High Court to seek a referral to the CJEU on the issue
of the validity of SCCs.226 After closing arguments on March 15, 2017,
the High Court reserved judgment for a later date. On October 3, 2017,
High Court Judge Justice Caroline Costello agreed with the Irish DPC
about the questionable status of SCCs, referring the issue of SCCs'
validity to the CJEU. 227 Some scholars have noted that this rationale
for challenging SCCs may call the adequacy of the BCRs into question
Employers?, LITTLER INSIGHT (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.littler.com/publication-
press/publication/what-does-european-court-justices-invalidation-us-eu-safe-harbor
[https://perma.cc/HT5L-UA22] (archived Sept. 24, 2017).
222. See supra Part III.A (detailing how a U.S. company must comply under the
Safe Harbor Agreement).
223. See Determann et al., supra note 209 (noting that these alternative
mechanisms could be updated with more specificity or could be complexly eliminated
under the GDPR. It is speculated that SCCs applicable to both processors and
controllers, which prior to GDPR contained more generalized descriptions, will be
updated for specific in reaction to the new data protection regime).
224. Explanatory Memorandum, Update on Litigation Involving Facebook and




225. See SIDLEY, supra note 78 (discussing the complaint and suggesting that
"invalidation of model contracts could cause a huge shake up of global data transfers
because following the invalidation of Safe Harbor, model contracts are the most popular
international data transfer tool").
226. See Update on Litigation Involving Facebook and Maximilian Schrems,
supra note 224 (listing the 5 expert witnesses on U.S. law that testified during the
hearing); Natasha Lomas, Legal Challenge to Facebook EU-US Data Transfer
Mechanism Kicks Off In Ireland, TECHORUNCH (Feb. 7, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/07/legal-challenge-to-facebook-eu-us-data-transfer-
mechanism-kicks-off-in-ireland/) [https:/perma.cc/9C6T-YCTL] (archived Sept. 24,
2017).
227. See Case 2016 No. 4809 P., Data Protection Comm'r v. Facebook Ireland
Limited and Maximillian Schrems, §333 (Oct. 3, 2017),
https://iapp.org/medialpdf/resource-center/IrishHC-Fb-Schrems-decision-10-17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3CBQ-9RB2] (archived Oct. 19, 2017) (Justice Costello cited the need
for "consistency and clarity" in the application of the Directive).
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as well.228 Irrespective of the ultimate holding, it is clear that SCCs
and BCRs are not more stable mechanisms than the Privacy Shield
framework.
Ultimately, while alternatives to the Privacy Shield framework do
technically exist, closer analysis of these alternatives suggests that
they may not offer measurable advantages that would justify
abandoning the self-certification framework. Additionally, certification
under the Privacy Shield framework provides unique benefits for
companies, undermining arguments for abandoning the framework
altogether. Not only does certification provide a presumption of
adequate privacy protection that satisfies the EU Data Protection
Directive, 229 but this presumption is universally binding on all
member states. Member states are obligated to honor the adequacy
decision of the EC. Thus, no matter where in the European Union the
personal data originates, US companies are able to legally use the
data.230 An additional benefit for companies is the explicit nature of
the compliance regime: the conditions under the Privacy Shield are
transparent and cost-effective in comparison to the alternative
mechanisms for compliance (e.g., consent, BCRS, and SCCs).2 31
D. Privacy Shield Reimagined: EU-U.S. Business Privacy Shield
Rather than discarding the framework entirely, this Note
proposes that the basic integrity of the Privacy Shield should remain
intact, but the role of the US government within the framework should
be removed. By keeping the basic self-certification structure and the
Privacy Shield Principles, this approach would allow the European
Union and the United States to maintain the progress that the Privacy
228. See Stewart Room, The Challenge to Safe Harbour- A Totem For Something
Much More Fundamental, PWC (Oct. 1, 2015),
http://pwc.blogs.com/data-protection/2015/10/the-challenge-to-safe-harbour-a-totem-
for-something-much-more-fundamental-.html [https://perma.cclNCV4-DFSQ] (archived
Sept. 24, 2017) (criticizing the notion that BCRs provide a greater assurance of adequacy
that Safe Harbor and predicting that BCRs are "vulnerable" to challenge).
229. See supra Part II.B. (while it still remains to be seen if this same
presumption of adequacy applies now that Directive will be replaced in 2018, with the
General Data Protection Regulation, their extraterritorial provisions both require an
"adequacy" standard).
230. See Benefits of Participation, PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK,
https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=Benefits-of-Participation (last visited Oct. 8,
2017) [https://perma.cc/CT6Q-97V6] (archived Sept. 24, 2017) (this implicitly does away
with EU Member State requirements for prior approval of data transfers).
231. Id. But see Determann, et al., supra note 209 (noting that the Privacy Shield
Framework still lacks real stability for US Businesses, as the Framework can be changed
annually and data subjects are permitted to revoke consent at any time).
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Shield has achieved, including more stringent data protections, greater
redressability for EU data subjects, and oversight mechanisms.232
1. Regulatory Examples: Fair Labor Association and Worker's Rights
Consortium
The concept of transnational regulation vis-d-vis a public-private
arrangement is not novel in other areas of international and
transnational law-examples in other industries include investor-
state arbitration,2 33 public-private infrastructure partnerships,234 and
corporate self-regulation. 235 Corporate self-regulation within the
garment and apparel industry provides two prominent examples of
private-public regulatory schemes that have accomplished what this
Note suggests for the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield.
The first example is the Fair Labor Association (FLA), a
collaborative cohort of universities, civil rights organizations, and
companies that are committed to safeguarding workers' rights
globally. 236 The organization requires companies who join the
organization to commit to upholding the FLA Workplace Code of
Conduct and to establish monitoring processes to insure internal
232. See supra Part IV.B (referencing the improvements in Privacy Shield from
its predecessor).
233. Many of the reasons that diplomatic protection is inadequate to investors,
similarly describe issues involving the US Government's participation in Privacy Shield:
the investor is dependent on the political discretion of investor's government (just as US
businesses and the EU are dependent on the enforcement and administration of Privacy
Shield by US agencies); the government may refuse to help the investors (US intelligence
agencies can push EU data subjects rights aside in the name of public safety or the public
interest); and diplomatic protection can be discontinued at any time Gust as US agencies
can abandon their commitments in Privacy Shield without any legal repercussion). In
just the same way that international investment law enabled investors to more
efficiently protect their foreign investments by giving them a mechanism for redress, the
proposed re-structuring of the Privacy Shield to eliminate the dependency on
government enforcement to protect EU data subject rights allows for a more effective
protection of EU data subjects by US businesses. See C.L. Lim & Jean Ho, International
Investment Arbitration, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES (last modified April 28, 2016),
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-
9780199796953-0135.xml [https://perma.cc/Z2WX-XV8Y] (archived Sept. 24, 2017).
234. lhat are Public Private Partnerships? WORLD BANK GROUP,
http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/overview/what-are-public-private-
partnerships [https://perma.cclA73T-9SYF] (archived Sept. 24, 2017).
235. See generally Rhys Jenkins, Corporate Codes of Conduct: Self Regulation in
a Global Economy, UNRISD (April 1, 2001),
http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3CO05BCCF9/searchlE3B3E78BAB9A886F80256B5E003
44278 [https://perma.cclALY8-X5JT] (archived Sept. 24, 2017) (discussing the
proliferation of corporate codes of conduct and the increased emphasis on corporate
responsibility in both the U.S. and abroad during the 1990s).
236. See About Us, FAIR LABOR ASS'N, http://www.fairlabor.org/about-us (last
visited Oct. 8, 2017) [https://perma.cclTFL3-5LPP] (archived Sept. 24, 2017) (detailing
the organizational structure and purpose of the Fair Labor Association).
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compliance.237 The threat of random factory inspection and publication
of all factory audits provides accountability for companies that opt in
to the FLA. 238 These features force participating companies to uphold
the Workplace Code of Conduct in order to continue doing business in
the market.239 Beyond ensuring compliance, FLA focuses on creating
innovative solutions for labor issues, allowing all interested parties to
participate.240
Another example of corporate self-regulation is the Worker Rights
Consortium (WRC), an independent labor rights organization that
specializes in global monitoring of factory working conditions.241 The
organization includes 186 colleges and universities in the United
States and abroad that are committed to making sure that university
apparel is produced in factories that respect the labor rights of their
workers. 242 The WRC's responsibilities include investigating and
documenting violations, and reporting violations to universities.243
The threat of losing university and collegiate clients motivates apparel
manufacturers to comply; by this process, the WRC uses market forces
to ensure compliance.244
237. See generally FLA Workplace Code of Conduct and Compliance Benchmarks,
FAIR LABOR Ass'N, http://www.fairlabor.org/our-work/labor-standards (revised Oct. 5,
2011) [https://perma.cc/PN99-XV6D] (archived Sept. 24, 2017) (detailing the specific
terms of the FLA Workplace Code of Conduct); FAIR LABOR ASs'N, CHARTER DOCUMENT
21-29 (last modified Feb. 12, 2014),
http://www.fairlabor.org/sites/default/files/flacharter_2-12-14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ATK4-ZPQD] (archived Sept. 24, 2017).
238. CHARTER DOCUMENT, supra note 237, at 16, 24.
239. See Accreditation, FAIR LABOR Ass'N, http://www.fairlabor.org/accreditation
(last visited Oct. 8, 2017) [https://perma.cc/LD8Y-TVWB] (archived Sept. 24, 2017)
(currently, compliance programs of 25 affiliated companies are accredited by the
FLA, including Nike, Patagonia, New Balance, Puma, and Gildan Activewear, Inc.,
to name a few).
240. FLA has supported various studies including hybrid corn production in
Argentina, creation of the PREPARE project to encourage worker epresentation in
Bangladesh, and the FLA Fashion Project which works to labor standards are being
upheld in global supply chain. See About Us, supra note 236 (detailing goals of the Fair
Labor Association).
241. See Don Wells, The Workers Rights Consortium, in BUSINESS REGULATION
AND NON-STATE ACTORS 239 (Darryl Reed et al. eds., 2012) (explaining the Russell
Athletic apparel closing of a Honduran Plant and WRC involvement in the investigation
report on the plant); Mission, WORKERS RIGHTS CONSORTIUM,
http://www.workersrights.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2017) [https://perma.cc/QF8V-
F9GF] (archived Oct. 8, 2017) (explaining the organization structure and purpose of the
Workers Rights Consortium).
242. Mission, supra note 241; see also Wells, supra note 241, at 240, 242 (noting
that the WRC has been integral in raising "consumer awareness of global sweatshops").
243. Mission, supra note 241; Wells, supra note 241, at 240, 242.
244. Mission, supra note 241.
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2. Replacement of US Government Role with a Data Privacy NGO
Following the example of both the FLA and the WRC, the
administration and enforcement responsibilities within the Privacy
Shield, previously filled by a variety of US agencies, would be delegated
to a Data Privacy NGO. This public-private arrangement would
maintain all of the substantive protections and processes of the Privacy
Shield, but replace the US government with an NGO that would serve
as a supervisory entity. The Data Privacy NGO would ensure
companies' compliance with the Privacy Shield Principles and oversee
the redress process for violations of EU data subjects' privacy rights,
similar to the monitoring and investigation functions of the FLA and
the WRC.245 Just as corporations who opt into the requirements under
the FLA and the WRC are held accountable by market forces, US
businesses will commit to compliance, irrespective of the supervisory
presence of US agencies, because of their self-motivated desire for
reliable and sufficient access to EU data.
The Privacy Shield NGO's board should be diverse and should
include more than just self-interested representatives of US businesses
seeking EU personal data.24 6 It should also include individuals who
work in privacy NGOs, both in the European Union and the United
States, and EU DPAs or other members of the EC.24 7 This membership
is important to preserve the lines of communication between the
European Union and the United States and to provide for greater
collaborative action to supplement the annual review required under
the new Privacy Shield Framework. Board membership should also
include technology experts within the data privacy field for two
reasons: (1) to serve as a resource for determining whether standards
for US corporations are reasonable, and (2) to ensure that the Privacy
Shield Framework is evolving with current technology.
245. See About Us, supra note 236 (explaining the structure and role of the FLA);
Wells, supra note 241 (explaining the role of the WRC in the closing of a Honduran
Russell Athletic Plant).
246 See Wells, supra note 241, at 242 (stating that the WRC Board does not
include corporate representatives for fear of capture by the apparel industry, a common
criticism of the FLA's factory monitoring proposal, which would have allowed companies
to have notice and choice of monitor prior to factory inspection). This Note proposes that
the Privacy Shield NGO Board can and should include a small, minority corporate
representation. However, the inclusion of EU and US privacy and technology experts
will ensure that the Board considers all perspectives, creating workable standards.
247. To protect WRC capture by the apparel industry, governance is based on
three constituencies (United Students Against Sweatshops, labor rights experts, and
member universities), each electing five directors to sit on the Board. See Wells, supra
note 241, at 242.
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3. Advantages to Data Privacy NGO Enforcement of EU-U.S. Business
Privacy Shield
Transforming the Privacy Shield into a public-private
transnational agreement eliminates the weaknesses that could
potentially invalidate the agreement. When looking at the weaknesses
and the challenges that face the Privacy Shield, surveillance remains
a cancerous element. 248 While the Privacy Shield places some
limitations on US surveillance and collection of EU personal data,249 it
lacks any concrete assurance against indiscriminate collection and
processing--especially within the context of a less privacy-
protectionist administration.250 This serves to critically threaten the
future of the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield.25 1
Additionally, when it invalidated Safe Harbor, the CJEU
expressed concern that nothing bound the US government to its
promises under the Framework.252 Jan Phillip Albrecht, a leading
member of the European Parliament on data privacy issues, expressed
similar concerns about the new Privacy Shield agreement, noting its
lack of "legally binding improvements."253 Restructuring the Privacy
Shield as a public-private agreement that relies on corporate self-
regulation provides a solution to both concerns of surveillance2 54 and
the lack of binding commitments25 5 from US agencies: rather than
attempting to "legally bind" US agencies to enforce privacy rules on
private corporations, this framework would rely on market forces to
naturally incentivize such corporations to comply.
Though some might criticize a public-private restructuring of the
Privacy Shield for punting the surveillance issue to the side, it is out of
necessity. Rather than let the problem of the permissible level of US
surveillance poison the rest of the Privacy Shield, the solution proposed
here chooses to write out the potential cause of invalidation. Thus, the
question of US government surveillance on EU citizens should be
248. See WP 29 Statement, supra note 115 (emphasizing that surveillance is still
an issue under Privacy Shield); see generally supra Part IV.C.1.
249. See Litt, supra note 118.
250. See WP 29 Statement, supra note 115 (noting that surveillance is still a
concern under Privacy Shield); see generally supra Part IV.C.1.
251. WP 29 Statement, supra note 115.
252. See supra Part III.B (noting that one of the CJEU's criticisms when
invalidating the EU-U.S. Safe Harbor was the absence of a mechanism binding the U.S.
government to uphold their side of the bargain).
253. Natasha Lomas, Europe and US Seal 'Privacy Shield' Data Transfer Deal to
Replace Safe Harbor, TECH CRUNCH (Feb. 2, 2016),
https://techcrunch.com/2016/02/02/europe-and-us-seal-privacy-shield-data-transfer-
deal-to-replace-safe-harbor/ [https://perma.cc/U8K4-ZD4W] (archived Sept. 24, 2017).
254. See supra Part IV.C.1 (describing the continued issue of protections from
surveillance by U.S. Intelligence Authorities under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield).
255. See supra Part IV.C.2.i (describing how the lack of binding commitments
from the U.S. is particularly troubling in the new Trump Administration).
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handled separately and at a different time between the United States
and the European Union. The data sharing agreement need not sink
because of the periphery issue of surveillance.
While a public-private arrangement eliminates the need to
directly tackle the surveillance issue, the Privacy Shield NGO could
take other remedial actions to indirectly address surveillance.25 6 First,
the Privacy Shield NGO can work with US businesses to reduce
opportunities for US government surveillance, including tightening up
the data retention principle so that US companies do not possess EU
data for long stretches of time.2 5 7 This would reduce the chance that
US intelligence authorities could compel production. 258 Further,
appointing data protection experts to the NGO's Board would
encourage innovation with regard to protections against
indiscriminate surveillance by intelligence authorities.259
A common complaint about corporate self-regulation is that it is
industry-funded.260 A Privacy Shield NGO will not be immune to this
critique. But this Note proposes that the combination of US businesses'
desire to engage in the market of EU personal data and the checks on
self-interested action by a diverse board would limit the risk that the.
NGO will become an agent of the industry rather than remain an ,
independent supervisory entity.
Ultimately, an EU-U.S. Business Privacy Shield agreement would
allow the surveillance issue to be dealt with in other capacities and
would protect against the threat of political instability both under the
current administration and in the future. By eliminating the US
government's role in enforcement, this arrangement would be limited
to self-interested participants: US businesses that seek EU data and
the EC, which is concerned about protecting its citizens' fundamental
right to privacy.
256. Protecting Workers' Rights Worldwide, FAIR LABOR Ass'N,
http://www.fairlabor.org/our-work (last visited Oct. 8, 2017) [https://perma.c/45S8-
DEKZ] (archived Sept. 24, 2017) (noting that the FLA allows "CSOs [civil society
organizations] to engage with companies and other stakeholders to find viable solutions
to labor concerns").
257. See id. (just as the FLA helps to create creative solutions for global labor
issues, the Data Privacy NGO can work together to more efficiently protect EU data
subjects' fundamental right to data privacy).
258. See id.
259. See Steven Greenhouse, Critics Question Record of Monitor Selected by
Apple, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/technology/critics-question-record-of-fair-labor-
association-apples-monitor.html [https://perma.cc/6QA8-36ER] (archived Sept. 24, 2017)
(explaining that Nike testified to fact that FLA had a significant impact on "leading
multi-stakeholder innovation and engagement on core labor standards").
260. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The transatlantic trade of personal data between the European
Union and the United States is of critical importance. The EU-U.S.
Privacy Shield is the most recent attempt by the trading partners to
reach a mutually satisfactory agreement allowing for the transfer of
EU personal data to the United States. When compared to its
predecessor, the EU-U.S. Safe Harbor, the Privacy Shield Framework
features numerous upgrades including improved data protection
mechanisms, more thorough redress, and increased oversight by the
US government. However, despite these developments, shortcomings
of the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield still exist, including a lack of concrete
protections from U.S. surveillance and external factors in both the
European Union and the United States that threaten the future of the
Framework.
As it stands, today's data privacy landscape is filled with
uncertainty. While the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield is by no means a perfect
settlement between trading partners, the need for an efficient
mechanism of trade is of paramount concern for all involved. By
restructuring the current framework into a public-private EU-U.S.
business arrangement and forming a Data Privacy NGO to take over
the administrative and enforcement role of US agencies, the
framework has a chance at continued vitality and evolution.
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